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REVERSED AND REMANDED  
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JUSTICE BEATTY: This action arose out of the foreclosure of a lien for 
delinquent homeowner regime fees against Todd C. Alexander. Alexander did not 
appeal the foreclosure; however, he moved to vacate the resulting sale.  
Alexander's motion to vacate the sale was denied and Alexander appealed.  The 
Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, finding Alexander failed to comply with 
section 18-9-1701 of the South Carolina Code to stay the sale and, therefore, the 
master-in-equity's issuance of the deed rendered the appeal moot.  
I. Facts 
Alexander purchased a home for his elderly father in Murrells Inlet, South 
Carolina. After his father was released from a second hospitalization, he did not 
return to the house.  Alexander neglected to pay the regime fees on the home and 
subsequently the homeowners' association's attorney informed him that a lien had 
been placed against the house. 
The homeowners' association initiated a foreclosure action and served a 
summons, complaint and lis pendens on Alexander.  He signed the certified receipt 
acknowledging that he received the documents.  However, he never responded to
1 Section 18-9-170 reads in relevant portion:  
If the judgment appealed from direct the sale or delivery of possession 
of real property, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed 
unless a written undertaking be executed on the part of the appellant, 
with two sureties, to the effect that during the possession of such 
property by the appellant he will not commit or suffer to be committed 
any waste thereon and that if the judgment be affirmed he will pay the 
value of the use and occupation of the property from the time of the 
execution of the undertaking until the delivery of possession thereof 
pursuant to the judgment, not exceeding a sum to be fixed by a judge 
of the court by which judgment was rendered and which shall be 
specified in the undertaking. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 18-9-170 (2014).
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the complaint, which led to a default.  He was subsequently served with notice of 
the hearing, affidavit of default, and the order of default at the same address.  He 
made no appearance and filed no appeal. 
The homeowners' association properly proceeded to have the home 
auctioned off to the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale.  Jerry Callahan, William 
George's authorized agent, was the highest bidder.  By Report and Judgment of 
Foreclosure Sale filed on April 29, 2011, the master-in-equity sold the property but 
did not issue the deed. 
Alexander, who lives in Pennsylvania, employed a property management 
company to inspect the house bi-weekly and maintain the property and grounds 
during the two years that the house had been vacant after his father moved out.  In 
June 2011, while he was hospitalized2, he learned from the property management 
company that the home had a new owner.  He then asked a friend to bring his mail 
to the hospital. He alleges he first received notice of the foreclosure action and 
sale at that time. 
He immediately tendered the regime fee payment in full to the homeowners'
association's attorneys but they declined to accept it because of potential liability to 
the third-party bidder. Alexander then filed a motion to vacate the sale.  In his 
memorandum in support of the motion, Alexander argued four grounds:  (1) the 
sale price was inadequate and the sale was accompanied by other facts warranting 
the court's interference; (2) the sale should be vacated to avoid forfeiture; (3) the 
sale should be vacated to avoid the third-party bidder's unjust enrichment; and (4) 
he timely redeemed the property.  
The master-in-equity denied the motion for several reasons.  He found that 
Alexander failed to allege improper service, lack of notice, lack of jurisdiction, 
excusable neglect and offered no reason for not sending a check once he received 
the summons and complaint.  Moreover, the master-in-equity found Alexander's 
failure to appeal the Decree of Foreclosure waived his equity-of-redemption rights.
 The master-in-equity then issued the deed to Callahan, as agent for George, 
and it was duly recorded. Alexander timely filed and served a Notice of Appeal 
2 Alexander was not hospitalized at the time of the foreclosure sale. 
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from the master's order denying his motion.  George filed and served a motion to 
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the issue appealed is moot because the 
foreclosure sale was finalized before Alexander filed and served his appeal. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with George in its order of dismissal.  It 
concluded that Alexander failed to stay the foreclosure sale because he did not 
comply with section 18-9-170 and the appeal is now moot because the master-in-
equity properly issued the deed.  This Court granted certiorari to review the Court 
of Appeals' decision.    
II. Issue Presented 
          Does the subsequent issuance of a deed moot a timely appealed order 
denying a motion to vacate the sale of foreclosed property? 
III. Discussion 
A. Mootness 
"A case is moot where a judgment rendered by the Court will have no 
practical legal effect upon an existing controversy because an intervening event 
renders any grant of effectual relief impossible for the Court."  S.C. Ret. Syst. Inv. 
Comm'n v. Loftis, 402 S.C. 382, 384, 741 S.E.2d 757, 758 (2013).  "[M]oot appeals 
result when intervening events prevent a decision on appeal from having an 
immediate impact on the parties."  15 S.C. Jur. Appeal and Error § 19 (Supp. 
2014). "Appellate court[s] will not pass on moot and academic questions or make 
an adjudication where there remains no actual controversy." Linda Mc Co., Inc. v. 
Shore, 390 S.C. 543, 558, 703 S.E.2d 499, 506 (2010). 
"In the civil context, there are three general exceptions to the mootness 
doctrine." Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 568, 549 S.E.2d 591, 596 (2001).  "First, 
an appellate court can take jurisdiction, despite mootness, if the issue raised is 
capable of repetition but evading review." Id. "Second, an appellate court may 
decide questions of imperative and manifest urgency to establish a rule for future 
conduct in matters of important public interest."  Id. at 568, 549 S.E.2d at 596. 
"Finally, if a decision by the trial court may affect future events, or have collateral 
consequences for the parties, an appeal from that decision is not moot, even though 
14 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the appellate court cannot give effective relief in the present case."  Id. at 568, 549 
S.E.2d at 596.
B. Arguments 
Alexander posits three arguments for why the Court of Appeals erred in 
issuing an order to dismiss the appeal.  First, a nonparty filed the motion to dismiss 
the appeal in contravention of Condon v. State, 354 S.C. 634, 583 S.E.2d 430 
(2003). Alexander notes that George could have intervened pursuant to Rule 24 of 
the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 213 of the South Carolina 
Appellate Court Rules.   Second, the dismissal created a new rule that a judicial 
sale cannot be appealed unless a writ of supersedeas has been issued and a bond 
posted, which runs counter to the rule in Ex Parte Moore, 346 S.C. 274, 550 
S.E.2d 877 (Ct. App. 2001). Finally, the dismissal conflicts with McLemore v. 
Powell, 32 S.C. 582, 10 S.E. 550 (1889), in that it holds the issuance of a deed 
renders an appeal from a judicial sale moot.  
C. Analysis
Alexander argues the Court of Appeals' order conflicted with established 
precedent that the issuance of a deed does not moot an appeal.  Although we offer 
no opinion on the merits of Alexander's appeal, we agree that the Court of Appeals 
erred. 
Our jurisprudence establishes that, despite the master-in-equity's issuance of 
a deed, an appellate court may reach the merits of the appeal.  See Antrum v. 
Hartsville Prod. Credit Ass'n, 228 S.C. 201, 89 S.E.2d 376 (1955) (deciding on 
petition to set aside foreclosure sale and declaring deed to purchaser void); Nichols 
v. Andrews, 157 S.C. 334, 154 S.E. 305 (1930) (deciding appeal from foreclosure 
and sale of property where deed was issued and no bond posted) ; Ex Parte 
Andrews, 152 S.C. 325, 150 S.E. 313 (1929) (explaining that purchaser of property 
was entitled to possession of property pending appeal because no bond was posted; 
remanding the case to be heard on the merits); Muckenfuss v. Fishburne, 68 S.C. 
41, 46 S.E. 537 (1903) (deciding defendant's appeal from order to set aside 
judgment of foreclosure where deed was executed to the purchaser); Scott v. Scott, 
29 S.C. 414, 7 S.E. 811 (1888) (deciding an action to enjoin the foreclosure of a 
mortgage for the sale of a mortgaged property after a deed was issued to plaintiff); 
Heritage Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Eagle Lake & Golf Condominiums, 318 S.C. 535, 
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458 S.E.2d 561 (Ct. App. 1995) (deciding homeowners' association appeal from 
foreclosure and sale where a master deed was issued). 
Based on the above-cited cases, it is clear that the issuance of a deed does 
not moot the appeal of a foreclosure sale and an appellate court may reach the 
merits. Accordingly, we find the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the case 
moot because a deed was issued after the sale of the property.  
IV. Conclusion 
The issuance of a deed does not render a motion to vacate the foreclosure 
sale moot.  Our state appellate courts have reached the merits of such appeals time
and again. 
We therefore reverse and remand3 this matter to the Court of Appeals to be 
considered on the merits. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
TOAL, C.J., HEARN, J., and Acting Justice James E. Moore, concur.  
PLEICONES, J., concurring in a separate opinion. 
3 See State v. Grovenstein, 335 S.C. 347, 354 n.6, 517 S.E.2d 216, 219 n.6 (1999) 
(explaining that remaining issues would be remanded to the Court of Appeals since 
they were not considered by that court previously). 
16 

  
                                        
 
  
 
 
JUSTICE PLEICONES:  I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals 
erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal as moot because the master issued a deed 
while the appeal was pending. I reach my conclusion by a different route, 
however, and therefore concur only in the result reached by the majority. 
Here we are concerned with an appeal from an order refusing to set aside a judicial 
sale. Petitioner's timely appeal of that order acted as an automatic stay of further 
proceedings, including the issuance of a deed, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 18-9-
220 (Supp. 2014). As the Court has explained, 
The defendant certainly had the right to appeal from [the order 
confirming the judicial sale]4 and obtain the judgment of the 
tribunal of last resort as to its correctness before any 
proceedings could be had under it [here, the buyer seeking 
possession], for until such final judgment was obtained, it could 
not be known whether there was any valid order of 
confirmation.  The notice of appeal from that order [confirming 
the judicial sale] operated as a stay of further proceedings under 
the provisions of section 3565 of the code. 
LeConte v. Irwin, 23 S.C. 106, 112 (1885). 

In my view, the parties, the Court of Appeals, and the majority are in error when 

they analyze the question whether the appeal prevented the master from issuing the 

deed under S.C. Code Ann. § 18-9-170 (1985), and decisions applying that statute 

in appeals from orders of foreclosure.6  While § 18-9-170 applies to an appeal from

an order that directs the sale or delivery of possession of real property, such as an 

4 Recall that under our earlier practice almost all foreclosure matters were referred 

to the master-in-equity to make a report, which was not final until confirmed by the 

circuit court. See Wachovia Bank of South Carolina, N.A. v. Player, 341 S.C. 424, 

535 S.E.2d 128 (2000). 

5 Now codified as § 18-9-220.

6 An appellant's failure to post the statutory bond required by § 18-9-170 does not 

moot the foreclosure appeal.  However, since the failure to post this bond permits 

the foreclosure sale to proceed during the appeal, Ex parte Andrews, 152 S.C. 325, 

150 S.E. 313 (1929), the remedy available to the mortgager is limited to the 

recalculation of the debt owed.  E.g., Nichols v. Andrews, 157 S.C. 334, 154 S.E. 

305 (1930). 
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order of foreclosure,7 it does not apply to an appeal of an order refusing to vacate a 
judicial sale. LeConte, supra. 
I agree that the master should not have issued a deed during the pendency of 
petitioner's appeal because that appeal acted as an automatic stay pursuant to § 18-
9-220. I agree that this erroneous action did not moot the appeal.  I agree that 
petitioner is entitled to have the merits of his appeal decided by the Court of 
Appeals. I therefore concur in the majority's decision to reverse the Court of 
Appeals' dismissal order and to remand the matter to that court for consideration of 
the direct appeal. 
7 See, e.g., Gerald v. Gerald, 30 S.C. 348, 9 S.E. 274 (1889). 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Julie Freeman, Appellant/Respondent,
v. 
J.L.H. Investments, LP, a/k/a Hendrick Honda of Easley, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 2014-000642 
Appeal From Pickens County 

Doyet A. Early, III, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27586 

Heard April 8, 2015 – Filed November 4, 2015 

AFFIRMED 

Terry E. Richardson, James David Butler and Brady 
Ryan Thomas, all of Richardson, Patrick, Westbrook & 
Brickman, L.L.C., of Barnwell, A. Camden Lewis, of
Lewis, Babcock & Griffin, L.L.P., of Columbia, Gedney 
M. Howe, III, of Gedney M. Howe, III, P.A., of 
Charleston, and Michael E. Spears, of Michael E. Spears, 
P.A., of Spartanburg, for Appellant/Respondent. 
James Y. Becker and Mary McFarland Caskey, both of 
Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, P.A., of Columbia, Sarah 
Patrick Spruill, of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, P.A., of 
Greenville, John T. Lay, of Gallivan, White & Boyd, 
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P.A., of Columbia, Marvin D. Infinger, of Nexsen Pruet, 
L.L.C., of Charleston, for Respondent/Appellant. 
JUSTICE BEATTY:  Julie Freeman, individually and on behalf of 5,314 
similarly situated car buyers, filed a lawsuit against J.L.H. Investments, LP, a/k/a 
Hendrick Honda of Easley ("Hendrick"), seeking damages under the South 
Carolina Dealers Act1 (the "Dealers Act") on the ground that Hendrick "unfairly" 
and "arbitrarily" charged all of its customers "closing fees"2 that were not 
calculated to reimburse Hendrick for actual closing costs.  A jury returned a verdict 
in favor of Freeman in the amount of $1,445,786.00 actual damages.  In post-trial 
rulings, the trial judge: (1) denied Hendrick's motions to overturn or reduce the 
jury's verdict; (2) granted Freeman's motions to double the actual damages award 
and to award attorneys' fees and costs3; and (3) denied Freeman's motion for 
                                                 
1  The South Carolina Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act 
(the "Dealers Act") is codified at S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-15-10 to -600 (2006 & 
Supp. 2014). Section 56–15–40 provides in relevant part, "It shall be deemed a 
violation of paragraph (a) of § 56–15–30 for any manufacturer . . . distributor, 
wholesaler . . . or motor vehicle dealer to engage in any action which is arbitrary, 
in bad faith, or unconscionable and which causes damage to any of the parties or to 
the public." S.C. Code Ann. § 56-15-40(1) (2006); see id. § 56-15-30(a) ("Unfair 
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices as defined in § 56-
15-40 are hereby declared to be unlawful."). 
 
2  S.C. Code Ann. § 37-2-307 (2015) (identifying the procedural requirements that 
motor vehicle dealers must satisfy before charging closing fees to customers but 
not the methodology for calculating the amount of the closing fee). 
 
3  Section 56-15-110 of the Dealers Act provides in relevant part: 
 
(1) In addition to temporary or permanent injunctive relief as provided 
in § 56-15-40(3)(c), any person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in this chapter may sue 
therefor in the court of common pleas and shall recover double the 
actual damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
 
(2) When such action is one of common or general interest to many 
persons or when the parties are numerous and it is impracticable to 
20 
 prejudgment interest.  This Court certified this case from the Court of Appeals.  
We affirm. 
  
I. Factual / Procedural History 
 
In 2000, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the "Closing Fee" Statute as 
a provision within the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code ("SCCPC").4  
Act No. 387, 2000 S.C. Acts 3311, Part II, § 82.  The "Closing Fee" Statute, which 
is codified at section 37-2-307 of the South Carolina Code, provides: 
 
Every motor vehicle dealer charging closing fees on a motor 
vehicle sales contract shall pay a one-time registration fee of ten 
dollars during each state fiscal year to the Department of Consumer 
Affairs. The closing fee must be included in the advertised price of 
the motor vehicle, disclosed on the sales contract, and displayed in a 
conspicuous location in the motor vehicle dealership. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 37-2-307 (2015).  In 2001, the South Carolina Department of 
Consumer Affairs (the "Department") issued a formal interpretation of this code 
provision and identified four procedural requirements that a motor vehicle dealer 
must meet before charging a closing fee to its customers.5  Danny Collins, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
bring them all before the court, one or more may sue for the benefit of 
the whole, including actions for injunctive relief. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-15-110(1), (2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 
4  The "South Carolina Consumer Protection Code" is codified in Title 37 of the 
South Carolina Code. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-101 to 37-29-130 (2015).  "The 
purpose of the SCCPC is to clarify the law governing consumer credit and to 
protect consumer buyers against unfair practices by suppliers of consumer credit."  
Fanning v. Fritz's Pontiac-Cadillac-Buick, Inc., 322 S.C. 399, 401, 472 S.E.2d 
242, 244 (1996) (citing section 37-1-102 of the SCCPC). 
 
5  Administrative Interpretation 2.307-0101 provides in relevant part: 
 
The assessment of a "closing" or "documentation" fee (also 
occasionally denominated as an "administrative," "processing," or 
"procurement" fee) in a consumer credit sale of a motor vehicle is 
dependant [sic] on four factors:  1.) The dealer must pay the 
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Deputy for Regulatory Enforcement and General Counsel for the Department, 
explained that the Department generally accepts all registration forms submitted by
the dealers, but does not establish the closing fee charged by the dealer.     
On July 12, 2006, Freeman purchased a pre-owned vehicle from Hendrick.  
Hendrick charged Freeman a $299.00 closing fee that was pre-printed on the final 
sales invoice and identified as "PROCUREMENT FEE."  Hendrick informed 
customers that it charged closing fees by posting a notice approved by the 
Department, which stated: 
THIS DEALERSHIP CHARGES A $299.00 CLOSING FEE AS [A] 
MEANS OF REIMBURSING IT FOR CERTAIN OVERHEAD 
COSTS SUCH AS DOCUMENT RETRIEVAL AND DOCUMENT 
PREPARATION. IT IS A CHARGE THAT IS PERMITTED BUT 
NOT REQUIRED BY LAW. THE FULL CASH PRICE CHARGED 
AT ANY DEALERSHIP DEPENDS ON MANY FACTORS, 
INCLUDING ALL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES BOUGHT WITH 
THE VEHICLE. (Emphasis added). 
Hendrick has consistently registered with the Department its intent to charge 
closing fees, which have ranged from $249 to $399.   
Department a registration fee each state fiscal year in the amount of 
ten ($10.00) dollars prior to the assessment of a closing fee; 2.) The 
existence of a closing fee must be disclosed on the sales contract; 3.) 
The closing fee must be disclosed in a statement displayed in a 
conspicuous location in the motor vehicle dealership; and 4.) If the 
closing fee is charged, and the vehicle is advertised, the closing fee 
must be included in the advertised price.  A dealership may use the 
attached form to make its filling [sic] with the Department.  A closing 
fee may only be assessed once these factors are met and the dealership 
has in its possession a date stamped copy of its disclosure stamped by 
the Department. The charging of a "closing," "documentation," or 
similar fees in connection with a consumer credit sale of a motor 
vehicle in the absence of any of these requirements constitutes the 
charging of an excess charge for Consumer Protection Code purposes. 
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After discussing her purchase with a friend, who is an attorney, Freeman 
initiated this action on August 29, 2006 against Hendrick.6  In her Complaint, 
Freeman alleged, inter alia, that Hendrick violated the Dealers Act by charging 
closing fees that "were not for reimbursement of certain closing costs"7 from
August 29, 2002 to August 29, 2006. Specifically, Freeman claimed Hendrick's 
"charging of closing fees in violation of § 37-2-307 renders the fees illegal and in 
violation of the Dealers Act." 
Subsequently, Hendrick filed motions seeking judgment on the pleadings 
and summary judgment. In these motions, Hendrick posited that it was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that Freeman:  (1) could not pursue a 
cause of action under the Dealers Act because section 37-5-202, which is located 
within the SCCPC, provides her exclusive remedy; (2) had not complied with the 
provisions of Rule 23, SCRCP8 for class certification; and (3) was precluded from
recovery based on the voluntary payment doctrine.   
6  Initially, the lawsuit was filed against multiple dealers some of whom settled, 
proceeded to trial, or were dismissed without prejudice pending the resolution of 
related lawsuits. This appeal only concerns the lawsuit against Hendrick. 
7  Freeman also alleged that Hendrick violated the "Closing Fee" Statute by failing 
to include the closing fees within the advertised price of its motor vehicles.  
However, at trial, the parties stipulated that this allegation was not a basis for the 
lawsuit. 
8  Rule 23 provides the following prerequisites for class certification: 
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all only if the court finds (1) the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class, (4) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class, and (5) in cases in which 
the relief primarily sought is not injunctive or declaratory with respect 
to the class as a whole, the amount in controversy exceeds one 
hundred dollars for each member of the class. 
Rule 23(a), SCRCP.
23 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the pre-trial proceedings, the trial judge adopted several rulings that 
were issued in a case similar to the one brought by Freeman.  In particular, the 
judge interpreted "closing fee," which is undefined in section 37-2-307 or any 
other code provision, to mean:  "A 'closing fee' is a pre-determined set fee for the 
reimbursement of closing costs, such as document retrieval and document 
preparation, but only those actually incurred by the dealer and necessary to the 
closing transaction." (Emphasis added).  
Ultimately, the judge denied Hendrick's pre-trial motions and the case 
proceeded to trial. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Freeman in the amount of 
$1,445,786.00 actual damages.  Both parties filed post-trial motions.  In her 
motions, Freeman sought an award of prejudgment interest, double the amount of 
actual damages, and attorneys' fees and costs under the Dealers Act.  Hendrick 
moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") and, alternatively, a 
new trial nisi remittitur. Following a hearing, the trial judge denied Hendrick's 
motions, granted Freeman's motion for double actual damages, and denied 
Freeman's motion for prejudgment interest.  The parties agreed to a consent order 
providing that Freeman was entitled to an established amount of attorneys' fees and 
costs contingent on the outcome of this appeal.   
The parties filed cross-appeals to the Court of Appeals.  This Court granted 
Freeman's unopposed motion to certify this case pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR.  
II. Discussion 
In the interest of logical progression, we have grouped Hendrick's eight 
issues into those that were raised during (1) pre-trial, (2) trial, and (3) post-trial.  
We have also incorporated into the post-trial category the issue raised by Freeman 
in her cross-appeal.
A. Pre-Trial Issues 
Hendrick contends that "[t]his case should never have reached the trial phase 
as a 'group action' under the Dealers Act." Specifically, Hendrick claims that: (1) 
Freeman was precluded from pursuing an action under the Dealers Act because her 
exclusive remedy for an alleged closing fee violation was under the SCCPC; (2) 
the class action proceeding was impermissible because Freeman failed to plead or 
prove the prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23, SCRCP; (3) the trial 
judge misinterpreted the term "closing fee" to mean that a dealer may only charge a 
closing fee that equates to the actual costs incurred by a dealer during closing; (4) 
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procedural compliance with the "Closing Fee" Statute is sufficient to absolve a 
dealer from an alleged violation; and (5) Freeman waived her claim by voluntarily 
paying the closing fee.   
1. Cause of Action Under the Dealers Act
As a threshold matter, we find that Freeman pursued the proper course of 
action in seeking recovery for a closing fee violation under the Dealers Act. 
Although the "Closing Fee" Statute identifies the procedural requirements that 
must be met before a dealer can charge a closing fee, neither the "Closing Fee"
Statute nor other provisions of the SCCPC provide any remedy for a consumer 
claiming a closing fee violation.   
As stated by this Court, "[t]he purpose of the SCCPC is to clarify the law 
governing consumer credit and to protect consumer buyers against unfair practices 
by suppliers of consumer credit." Fanning v. Fritz's Pontiac-Cadillac-Buick, Inc., 
322 S.C. 399, 401, 472 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1996) (citing section 37-1-102 of the 
SCCPC); see Davis v. NationsCredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 326 S.C. 83, 86, 484 
S.E.2d 471, 472 (1997) ("One of the primary purposes of the Consumer Protection 
Code is to 'protect consumer buyers, lessees, and borrowers against unfair practices 
by some suppliers of consumer credit, having due regard for the interests of 
legitimate and scrupulous creditors.' " (quoting section 37-1-102(2)(d))).
Despite the well-defined purpose to protect against unfair practices 
involving consumer credit transactions, Hendrick identifies several provisions in 
the SCCPC as potential avenues for recovery.9  However, none of these are 
applicable to the type of claim brought by Freeman.  A review of these code 
sections reveals that the remedies are directed at recovery for specifically identified 
acts involving lending transactions between creditors and debtors.  Here, Freeman 
did not allege any unfair practice regarding the financing of her vehicle purchase.  
Rather, she claimed she was unfairly charged a "closing fee" that bore no relation 
to the actual expenses incurred by Hendrick.  Given this claim did not involve an 
unfair consumer credit transaction between a creditor and a debtor, Freeman had 
no means of recovery under the SCCPC. Instead, Freeman's claim fell within the 
purview of the Dealers Act, which:  (1) prohibits a motor vehicle dealer from
engaging "in any action which is arbitrary, in bad faith, or unconscionable and 
which causes damage to any of the parties or to the public;" and (2) provides a 
9  See S.C. Code Ann. § 37-5-202(2), (3), (8) (2015) (identifying effect of creditor's 
violations of the SCCPC on the rights of a consumer). 
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remedy for a consumer that is damaged by this action.  S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-15-
40(1), -110(1), (2) (2006). 
Furthermore, because the Legislature enacted the SCCPC and the Dealers 
Act both for the purpose of consumer protection, the statutes cannot be read in 
isolation. See Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 355 S.C. 361, 378, 585 S.E.2d 292, 300 
(2003) ("The Consumer Protection Code and the Dealers Act share a common 
purpose: protection of the consumer."); see also Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, 
393 S.C. 332, 342, 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011) ("A statute as a whole must receive 
practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, 
and policy of lawmakers."). Considering this common purpose, we believe the 
Legislature intended for the statutes to be construed together as it expressly 
provided for the SCCPC to supplement remedies afforded to consumers in law and 
equity, which would necessarily include those provided in the Dealers Act.  See
S.C. Code Ann. § 37-1-103 (2015) ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions 
of this title, the Uniform Commercial Code and the principles of law and equity, 
including the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, 
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating 
or invalidating cause supplement its provisions." (emphasis added)). 
Consequently, in reconciling the two statutes, we find that the "Closing Fee" 
Statute sets forth the procedural requirements that a dealer must satisfy before 
charging a closing fee whereas the Dealers Act sets forth the remedy for an alleged 
"closing fee" violation. See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 88, 533 S.E.2d 578, 
583 (2000) ("Statutes dealing with the same subject matter must be reconciled, if 
possible, so as to render both operative.").   
Significantly, the Department's Administrative Interpretation, when read in 
full, supports this construction as it references provisions of the Dealers Act and 
indicates that the "Closing Fee" Statute was not intended to be a comprehensive 
remedy.  The Administrative Interpretation states: 
The Supreme Court specifically indicated in its holding in 
Fanning that it did not imply such fees might not be actionable under 
other applicable law.  322 S.C. at 404, 472 S.E.2d at 245, N.8.  
Likewise, the General Assembly did not further clarify the issue other 
than to indicate the fees might be legally charged for Consumer 
Protection Code purposes if the requisite filing and disclosures are 
made. The Department is aware of nothing in the General Assembly's
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enactment that legitimizes a closing fee or any fee or charge if it is 
assessed through fraud or misrepresentation.  
Because the Department is charged with executing the "Closing Fee" Statute, we 
must give credence to its interpretation.  See Faile v. S.C. Emp't Sec. Comm'n, 267 
S.C. 536, 540, 230 S.E.2d 219, 221-22 (1976) ("The construction of a statute by 
the agency charged with executing it is entitled to the most respectful consideration 
and should not be overruled without cogent reasons.").  
Finally, we note that our appellate courts have, in other contexts, rejected the 
assertion that the remedies found within the SCCPC are the exclusive remedy for a 
violation of consumer transactions.  See Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 333 S.C. 33, 
508 S.E.2d 16 (1998) (holding that consumers, who purchased home products 
secured by a mortgage on their homes, were not limited to the remedy under 
section 37-5-202 of the SCCPC because the Legislature did not specifically 
provide that this code section was the exclusive remedy).  Our appellate courts 
have also implicitly approved proceeding under the Dealers Act for an alleged 
closing fee violation. See Gardner v. Newsome Chevrolet-Buick, Inc. 304 S.C. 
328, 404 S.E.2d 200 (1991) (reversing, in a case pre-dating the enactment of the 
"Closing Fee" Statute, trial judge's denial of class certification for car buyers' suit 
alleging dealer committed an "unfair act" in charging a closing fee in violation of 
the Dealers Act).  Accordingly, we conclude that Freeman properly pursued 
recovery under the Dealers Act.10
2. Class Action Lawsuit 
With respect to Hendrick's claim regarding class certification, we find that 
Freeman's decision to proceed under the provisions of the Dealers Act rather than 
Rule 23 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure was permissible and does 
not warrant the granting of a new trial to Hendrick.   
10  Even if we assume that Hendrick is correct in its averment that the SCCPC 
provides the sole remedy for Freeman, we question what would happen in cases of 
cash or non-credit financed sales.  Taken to its logical extreme, a person who did 
not use credit financing to purchase a vehicle would have no method of recovery 
for a violation of the "Closing Fee" Statute.  We do not believe the Legislature 
intended to leave these consumers without a remedy.  By enacting the Dealers Act, 
the Legislature clearly sought to protect all automobile purchasers regardless of the 
method of purchase.
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Although the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure are broadly worded to 
apply to "all suits of a civil nature,"11 Rule 23 is not necessarily applicable to class 
action lawsuits brought under the Dealers Act.  As previously stated, the 
Legislature enacted section 56-15-110(2) of the Dealers Act to create a statutory 
right for a person to sue in a representative capacity.  Clearly, at the time the 
Legislature enacted section 56-15-110(2), it was aware of the existence of the 
general class action statute codified in section 15-5-50.  See Whitner v. State, 328 
S.C. 1, 6, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1997) (recognizing the basic presumption that the 
Legislature has knowledge of previous legislation).  Notably, the language of 
section 56-15-110(2) mirrors that of section 15-5-50.12  By enacting nearly 
identical provisions, we believe the Legislature intended for the statutes to operate 
independently. If the Legislature deemed section 15-5-50 sufficient to cover all 
class action lawsuits, it would have been unnecessary to incorporate identical 
language into section 56-15-110(2). We believe the inclusion of the class action 
language in section 56-15-110(2) was a purposeful decision by the Legislature to 
create an alternative method for a consumer to sue in a representative capacity 
under the Dealers Act. 
After Rule 23 was adopted to replace section 15-5-50,13 the Legislature did 
not repeal section 56-15-110(2). By leaving intact section 56-15-110(2), we 
believe the Legislature intended to provide those harmed by violations of the 
Dealers Act a specific procedural avenue to pursue their claims.  The adoption of 
11 See Rule 1, SCRCP (providing that the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 
"govern the procedure in all South Carolina courts in all suits of a civil nature 
whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, with the exceptions stated in Rule 
81"). 
12 See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-5-50 (1976) (repealed 1985)("When the question is 
one of common or general interest to many persons or when the parties are very 
numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or 
more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole."); id. § 56-15-110(2) (2006) 
("When such action is one of common or general interest to many persons or when 
the parties are numerous and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, 
one or more may sue for the benefit of the whole, including actions for injunctive 
relief."). 
13   Act No. 100, 1985 S.C. Acts 277 (adopting South Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure on July 1, 1985).
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Rule 23, as a general procedural rule, cannot operate to eliminate the statutory right
found in section 56-15-110(2).
Moreover, we discern no conflict between Rule 23 and section 56-15-
110(2). While the requirements for class certification in Rule 23 are expressly 
enumerated, we interpret subsection (2) of section 56-15-110 to be the functional 
equivalent of the Rule 23 requirements. Similar to the provisions of Rule 23, 
section 56-15-110(2) authorizes a consumer to sue in a representative capacity if 
the following prerequisites are met: (1) the action is one of common or general 
interest; (2) the class is so numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them
all before the court; and (3) the representative party can obtain relief for the benefit 
of the class as a whole.  Accordingly, we conclude that Rule 23 and section 56-15-
110(2) present independent, alternative methods for which a claimant may, in a 
representative capacity, pursue a cause of action under the Dealers Act on behalf of 
those similarly situated.   
Even assuming that Rule 23 is applicable, the facts of the instant case 
satisfied the prerequisites of this rule.  In his order denying Hendrick's post-trial 
motions, the trial judge found:  (1) the lawsuit involved common claims on behalf 
of a large number of purchasers; (2) the testimony established that Freeman's claim 
was typical of every other customer's claim regarding the payment of a closing fee; 
and (3) the parties provided notice to all of the affected customers and provided a 
sufficient time period to allow those customers to opt out of the lawsuit.  We agree 
with these findings and would add that the amount in controversy for each claimant 
exceeded $100 as Hendrick registered closing fees ranging from $249 to $399.  
Therefore, we conclude the class action lawsuit was properly brought under the 
Dealers Act. Cf. Gardner, 304 S.C. at 331, 404 S.E.2d at 202 (recognizing, in a 
case pre-dating the "Closing Fee" Statute, car buyers' suit seeking recovery under 
the Dealers Act against car dealer for charging a closing fee met all the class 
certification requirements of Rule 23). 
3. Effect of Procedural Compliance 
Having found that the class action lawsuit was proper, we hold that Hendrick 
was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law simply because the Department 
accepted Hendrick's closing fee registration form.  Essentially, Hendrick contends 
its procedural compliance with the "Closing Fee" Statute, as interpreted by the 
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Department and this Court in Fanning,14 effectively absolved it from any liability 
via the Filed Rate Doctrine,15 the Good Faith Error Defense,16 and the Safe Harbor 
Defense.17
Freeman does not dispute that Hendrick complied with the procedural 
requirements of the "Closing Fee" Statute.18  However, meeting these procedural 
14 See Fanning v. Fritz's Pontiac-Cadillac-Buick, Inc., 322 S.C. 399, 472 S.E.2d 
242 (1996) (holding, in a case pre-dating the "Closing Fee" Statute, "Procurement 
Fee" was not an "unauthorized fee" or "unconscionable" under the SCCPC but, 
rather, was an element of the negotiated price of the vehicle). 
15 See Edge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 S.C. 511, 517, 623 S.E.2d 387, 
391 (2005) ("The filed rate doctrine stands for the proposition that because an 
administrative agency is vested with the authority to determine what rate is just and 
reasonable, courts should not adjudicate what a reasonable rate might be in a 
collateral lawsuit." (citation omitted)). 
16  S.C. Code Ann. § 37-5-202(7) (2015) ("A creditor may not be held liable in an 
action brought under this section for a violation of this title if the creditor shows by 
a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted 
from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably 
adapted to avoid the error." (emphasis added)).
17  S.C. Code Ann. § 37-6-506(3) (2015) ("No provision of this title or of any 
statute to which this title refers which imposes any penalty on any creditor shall 
apply to any act done, or omitted to be done, in conformity with any rule or 
regulation so adopted, amended or repealed or in conformity with any written 
order, opinion, interpretation or statement of the Commission or of the 
administrator, notwithstanding that such rule, regulation, order, opinion, 
interpretation or statement may, after such act or omission, be amended, or 
rescinded or be determined by judicial or other authority to be erroneous or invalid 
for any reason."); see id. § 37-6-104(4) ("Except for refund of an excess charge, no 
liability is imposed under this title for an act done or omitted in conformity with a 
rule of the administrator notwithstanding that after the act or omission the rule may
be amended or repealed or be determined by judicial or other authority to be 
invalid for any reason."). 
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requirements only entitled Hendrick to charge a closing fee.  As testified by Danny 
Collins, the Department neither determines the amount of the fee nor reviews the 
dealer's financial records to evaluate how the amount was calculated.  Notably, 
Collins stated that "[i]t's pretty much just a registration."  Moreover, the "Closing 
Fee" Statute does not require a dealer to inform the Department of the amount of 
its closing fee nor does it empower the Department to approve or disapprove the 
amount of a closing fee.  Rather, as acknowledged by Collins, the Department is 
"simply charged with the day-to-day enforcement of the procedural portions of the 
Closing Fee Statute."  Because the Department is not vested with the authority to
determine a reasonable "closing fee," the Filed Rate Doctrine does not apply to bar 
Freeman's claim.  Additionally, Hendrick does not claim that it made a bona fide 
error in calculating the amount of the closing fee. 
Furthermore, neither the Good Faith Error Defense nor the Safe Harbor 
Defense, codified at sections 37-5-202(7) and 37-6-506(3) respectively, provides 
Hendrick immunity from liability as these code sections only apply to consumer 
credit transactions brought under Title 37 of the SCCPC.  Here, Freeman brought 
this action pursuant to section 56-15-40 of the Dealers Act and not under the 
SCCPC. 
Although procedural compliance with the "Closing Fee" Statute enabled 
Hendrick to charge a closing fee, it was still required to accurately assess the 
amount of the fee charged because, as noted in Fanning, these fees may be
attacked on grounds "such as claims for fraud, misrepresentation or unfair trade 
practices." Fanning, 322 S.C. at 404 n.8, 472 S.E.2d at 245 n.8. 
4. Definition of "Closing Fee" 
The trial judge interpreted "closing fee" to mean:  "A 'closing fee' is a pre-
determined set fee for the reimbursement of closing costs, such as document 
retrieval and document preparation, but only those actually incurred by the dealer
and necessary to the closing transaction."  Hendrick challenges this definition 
primarily by differentiating between the definitions of the word "fee" and "cost."   
Hendrick contends that "[g]iven the ordinary definition of fee, the proper 
construction of the [Closing Fee] Statute is that a closing fee is simply a fee 
18  The parties stipulated that the remaining procedural requirement was not at 
issue because Freeman did not purchase her vehicle as the result of seeing a 
publicized advertisement. 
31 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
   
 
    
 
charged at closing for services rendered by a dealership."  Hendrick further asserts 
that the term "cost" in the context of the "Closing Fee" Statute "would refer to the 
amount of money a dealer is required to expend to perform the services it provides 
to a customer at closing, and to otherwise comply with the disclosure, 
documentation, and record retention requirements imposed under state and federal 
law." For reference, Hendrick cites to several statutes from other jurisdictions 
where the state legislature expressly directed how a closing fee should be 
determined.  Because our Legislature failed to provide specific directives regarding 
the amount of the fee, what can be included in the fee, and how the fee should be 
set, Hendrick maintains the "Closing Fee" Statute is effectively a disclosure statute 
that is administered by the Department. 
For several reasons, we agree with the trial judge's definition of the term 
"closing fee" and conclude that it did not render the "Closing Fee" Statute 
unconstitutionally vague19 or require prospective application.20  Because this term
is undefined in the "Closing Fee" Statute, the judge properly looked to the usual 
and customary meaning of the term "fee".  See Branch v. City of Myrtle Beach, 340 
S.C. 405, 409-10, 532 S.E.2d 289, 292 (2000) ("When faced with an undefined 
statutory term, the Court must interpret the term in accord with its usual and 
customary meaning.").  
While we recognize the difficulty a dealer may face in determining the exact 
amount of a specific purchaser's closing fee prior to closing, we agree with the trial 
judge's interpretation that the amount charged must bear some relation to the actual 
19 See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Michelle G., 407 S.C. 499, 506, 757 S.E.2d 388, 
392 (2014) ("[A]ll the Constitution requires is that the language convey sufficiently 
definite warnings as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common 
understanding and practices."(quoting Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 572, 549 
S.E.2d 591, 599 (2001))); Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 572, 549 S.E.2d 591, 599 
(2001) (recognizing that an undefined term in a statute does not automatically 
render the statute unconstitutionally vague (citing State v. Hamilton, 276 S.C. 173, 
276 S.E.2d 784 (1981))). 
20 See Toth v. Square D Co., 298 S.C. 6, 8, 377 S.E.2d 584, 585 (1989) ("The 
general rule regarding retroactive application of judicial decisions is that decisions 
creating new substantive rights have prospective effect only, whereas decisions 
creating new remedies to vindicate existing rights are applied retrospectively.  
Prospective application is required when liability is created where formerly none 
existed." (citations omitted)).
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expenses incurred for the closing.21  As stated in language recommended by the 
Department, Hendrick posted a notice that it charged a closing fee "as a means of 
reimbursing it for certain overhead costs such as document retrieval and document 
preparation." By notifying customers that it sought to be reimbursed, Hendrick 
clearly communicated that the closing fee was intended to be repayment for that 
which was expended. See Black's Law Dictionary 1157 (5th ed. 1979) (defining 
"reimburse" to mean "to pay back, to make restoration, to repay that expended, to 
indemnify; or make whole").  
Notwithstanding this notice, Hendrick failed to offer any evidence that it 
calculated the costs that comprised the closing fee.  When questioned as to how 
Hendrick arrived at the closing fee, Don Pendleton, the General Manager, testified 
that he "didn't sit there and do the math," he was not sure about the actual costs of 
retrieving and preparing documents for closing, and he did not know "the exact 
charge." Further, Pendleton believed that Hendrick was "limited to seeking 
reimbursement for [Hendrick's] closing costs."  Pendleton also acknowledged that 
he did not know how the original $199 closing fee was determined and that 
Hendrick's subsequent increases in the amount charged for the closing fee were not 
tied to Hendrick's costs.   
Although Hendrick's expert, Michael Thompson, testified regarding the 
average closing cost per year, he admitted that he did not see anything to suggest 
that Hendrick did any kind of analysis at the time Hendrick set the closing fee.  
Moreover, in calculating the average closing cost, Thompson included expenses 
for the salaries of finance and sales managers, the building, utilities, and "outside 
services." All of these are general operating expenses and not directly tied to the 
closing of a motor vehicle sale.  If a motor vehicle dealer wishes to be 
compensated for these expenses, it may include them as part of the overall 
purchase price of a vehicle. However, by specifically delineating a "closing fee" 
from the purchase price of the vehicle, the dealer must account for the costs that 
comprise this fee.  Without such an accounting, a dealer is charging a consumer an 
additional amount that is not directly related to the expenses incurred in closing the 
sale of a motor vehicle but is, nevertheless, identified as a closing fee.  We find 
that such practice effectively circumvents the purpose of the "Closing Fee" Statute 
and the Dealers Act, which is, in part, to protect consumers from charges that are 
above the advertised price listed by the dealer.   
21  If the Legislature disagrees, it is free to correct our interpretation and 
specifically direct how a dealer determines the amount of a closing fee. 
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Thus, although we agree with Hendrick that the "Closing Fee" Statute is a 
disclosure statute and the Department serves as a repository for the required filings, 
we find that the "Closing Fee" Statute does more than require disclosure of the 
"closing fee." It also requires that the "closing fee" be included in the advertised 
price in order to avoid unexpected, additional costs for the purchase of an 
automobile.  
Consequently, we affirm the trial judge's definition of "closing fee."  We 
emphasize that a "closing fee" is not limited to expenses incurred for document 
preparation, retrieval, and storage. However, any costs sought to be recovered by a 
dealer under a closing fee charge must be directly related to the services rendered 
and expenses incurred in closing the purchase of a vehicle.  Given that each vehicle 
purchase is different, compliance with the "Closing Fee" Statute does not require 
that the dealer hit the "bull's-eye" for each purchase.  While each sale may be 
different, it is inconceivable that each closing requires performance of dissimilar 
tasks. To the contrary, the category of tasks required to close a sale is the same in 
every sale. However, the number of times a certain task is performed may differ.  
As a result, a dealer may comply with the statute by setting a closing fee in an 
amount that is an average of the costs actually incurred in all closings of the prior 
year. 
5. Voluntary Payment Doctrine 
We also disagree with Hendrick's reliance on the voluntary payment doctrine 
as a complete defense.  Freeman acknowledged that the "Procurement Fee" in an 
amount of $299 was identified on her sales contract and that she paid this amount 
at the time of purchase.  However, Freeman paid the closing fee without full 
knowledge of what comprised the fee.  In fact, even if Freeman had inquired, no 
Hendrick employee could have explained how Hendrick arrived at this amount.  
Accordingly, we find that Hendrick's reliance on the voluntary payment doctrine is 
misplaced. See Hardaway v. S. Ry. Co., 90 S.C. 475, 488-89, 73 S.E. 1020, 1025 
(1912) ("It is an elementary principle that no action will lie to recover money 
voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all the facts" and "without any fraud, 
duress, or extortion" to make such payment. (emphasis added)).
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the trial judge that none of the 
affirmative defenses or arguments asserted by Hendrick entitled it to judgment as a 
matter of law prior to trial. 
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B. Trial Issues 
Even if the class action lawsuit was properly tried and submitted to the jury, 
Hendrick asserts the trial judge erred with respect to the jury charge.  Initially, 
Hendrick claims the judge erred in refusing to charge its proposed instructions on 
the following:  (1) the Good Faith Error and Safe Harbor Defenses identified in the 
SCCPC; (2) the voluntary payment doctrine, waiver, and estoppel; and (3) a 
claimant's duty to read the contract under which she seeks to recover.  Hendrick 
further argues that the judge erred in declining to charge Hendrick's proposed 
instruction warning the jury against awarding speculative damages.  Hendrick also 
challenges the propriety of the judge's charge on the definitions of:  (1) a "closing 
fee"; and (2) what constitutes an "unfair, "arbitrary," or "unconscionable" action 
for purposes of the Dealers Act. Finally, Hendrick contends that the judge erred in 
submitting a general verdict form to the jury rather than the special verdict form 
proposed by Hendrick. 
1. Jury Charge 
We find the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in charging the jury.  See
Cole v. Raut, 378 S.C. 398, 404, 663 S.E.2d 30, 33 (2008) ("An appellate court 
will not reverse the trial court's decision regarding jury instructions unless the trial 
court committed an abuse of discretion.").  Based on our review of Hendrick's 
proposed jury instructions, the charges were another attempt to assert its pre-trial 
arguments. 
Hendrick requested that the judge charge the Safe Harbor Defense, the Good 
Faith Error Defense, the voluntary payment doctrine, waiver, estoppel, and the 
duty of a claimant to read the subject contract.  As previously discussed, Hendrick 
was precluded as a matter of law from relying on the Safe Harbor Defense, the 
Good Faith Error Defense, and the voluntary payment doctrine.  Thus, the trial 
judge properly refused to charge these requests. 
By the same reasoning, we find the remaining charges of waiver, estoppel, 
and the duty of a claimant to read the subject contract were inapplicable as 
Freeman paid the closing fee without knowledge of what comprised the amount of 
the fee. Therefore, we discern no reversible error as to the judge's refusal to charge 
Hendrick's requests.  See Wells v. Halyard, 341 S.C. 234, 237, 533 S.E.2d 341, 343 
(Ct. App. 2000) ("A trial court must charge the current and correct law."); see also
Pittman v. Stevens, 364 S.C. 337, 340, 613 S.E.2d 378, 380 (2005) ("A trial court's 
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refusal to give a properly requested charge is reversible error only when the 
requesting party can demonstrate prejudice from the refusal."). 
  Furthermore, reviewing the jury charge as a whole, the judge charged the 
current and correct law and any alleged error did not result in prejudice to 
Hendrick. See Keaton ex rel. Foster v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 334 S.C. 488, 497, 
514 S.E.2d 570, 575 (1999) ("In reviewing jury charges for error, we must consider 
the court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at 
trial." (citation omitted)).  As previously discussed, the judge properly defined the 
term "closing fee" by its usual and customary meaning.  Moreover, the judge's
instructions regarding an "arbitrary," "bad faith," or "unconscionable" action were 
consistent with the applicable statutes and case law interpreting these statutes.  See 
deBondt v. Carlton Motorcars, Inc., 342 S.C. 254, 263, 536 S.E.2d 399, 404 (Ct. 
App. 2000) (defining "bad faith" and "arbitrary" under the Dealers Act; discussing 
"arbitrary," "bad faith," and "unconscionable" conduct under the Dealers Act).  The 
judge's instructions also covered the substance of Hendrick's requests to charge.  
Additionally, despite Hendrick's challenge to the judge's definition of an 
"unfair" act, we discern no error as the judge's instruction was based on a specific 
provision of the Dealers Act that declares "unfair" acts to be unlawful and case law 
defining the term "unfair."  See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-15-30(a) (2006) ("Unfair 
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices as defined in § 56-
15-40 are hereby declared to be unlawful."); Gentry v. Yonce, 337 S.C. 1, 12, 522 
S.E.2d 137, 143 (1999) (defining an "unfair" act as "when it is offensive to public 
policy or when it is immoral, unethical, or oppressive"), overruled on other 
grounds by Proctor v. Whitlark & Whitlark, Inc., Op. No. 27580 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 
filed Oct. 7, 2015) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 39 at 46).22
22  Hendrick takes issue with the trial judge utilizing case law involving the South 
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act ("SCUTPA") to define the term "unfair."  
Because this term is undefined in the Dealers Act, the judge properly looked to this
case law as SCUTPA is modeled after the language of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and, thus, was appropriate for interpretation. See S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 56-15-30(b) (2015) ("In construing paragraph (a) the courts may be guided by the 
definitions in the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45)."); see also State 
v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., Op. No. 27502 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed July 8, 
2015) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 26 at 8) (recognizing that the language in SCUTPA 
is modeled after the Federal Trade Commission Act; noting the FTC Policy 
Statement on Unfairness provides the following general characteristics of an unfair 
practice claim "(1) whether the practice injures consumers; (2) whether it violates 
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With respect to the judge's charge on damages, we find the judge accurately 
charged the jury on how to arrive at an amount of damages and specifically 
instructed the jury that it had discretion to award a value of $0 up to the full 
amount of the charged closing fee.  Thus, even though the judge declined to charge 
Hendrick's instruction warning the jury against awarding speculative damages, the 
charge was correct and did not result in prejudice to Hendrick.  Accordingly, even 
giving credence to Hendrick's claim that portions of the charge were incomplete or 
erroneous, we find that Hendrick was not prejudiced because the charge as a whole 
was reasonably free from error.   
2. Verdict Form
Finally, we find the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to submit 
Hendrick's proposed special verdict form to the jury.  See Butler v. Gamma Nu 
Chapter of Sigma Chi, 314 S.C. 477, 483, 445 S.E.2d 468, 471 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("The question of whether to grant a party's request for a special verdict form is a 
matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court."); see also S.C. Dep't of 
Transp. v. First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 372 S.C. 295, 300-01, 641 S.E.2d 903, 906 
(2007) (recognizing that trial judge has discretion to determine how a case is 
submitted to the jury).   
The jury was tasked with answering the narrow question of whether 
Hendrick charged an improper amount as its closing fee in violation of the Dealers 
Act. Contrary to the first question on the special verdict form proposed by 
Hendrick, there was no dispute that Hendrick complied with the procedural 
requirements of the "Closing Fee" Statute.  Furthermore, the judge properly 
charged the jury regarding the "Closing Fee" Statute, the Dealers Act, and the 
award of damages. We would also note that the exhibit submitted by Freeman 
regarding actual damages broke down the amount of closing costs charged per 
year, which was similar to the third question on Hendrick's proposed verdict form.  
Thus, we conclude that the general verdict form was sufficient.  Accordingly, we 
find that Hendrick was not prejudiced by the trial judge's refusal to submit the 
special verdict form to the jury.  See Steele v. Dillard, 327 S.C. 340, 343, 486 
S.E.2d 278, 280 (Ct. App. 1997) ("Error in the refusal to submit special 
interrogatories or special issues to the jury will constitute ground for reversal only 
if prejudice results to the complaining party." (quoting 5A C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 
1762(b), at 1136 (1958))). 
established public policy; (3) whether it is unethical or unscrupulous." (emphasis 
added) (footnote and citation omitted)).  
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C. Post-Trial Issues 
Hendrick contends the judge erred in denying its motion for JNOV and, 
alternatively, a new trial nisi remittitur. Hendrick further argues that the judge 
erred in doubling the jury's award of actual damages.   
1. JNOV / New Trial Nisi Remittitur
In its JNOV motion, Hendrick essentially reiterated all of its pre-trial 
arguments that were rejected by the judge.  Furthermore, as the basis for its motion 
for new trial nisi remittitur, Hendrick claimed the verdict should have been 
reduced to only those damages incurred by Freeman and not the other members of 
the class. 
Having rejected Hendrick's arguments regarding pre-trial issues, we discern 
no errors of law for which to reverse the judge's denial of Hendrick's motions.  See
Clark v. S.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 362 S.C. 377, 382-83, 608 S.E.2d 573, 576 
(2005) (noting that an appellate court will reverse the trial court's ruling on a 
directed verdict motion or JNOV motion only where there is no evidence to 
support the ruling or where the ruling is controlled by error of law); Waring v. 
Johnson, 341 S.C. 248, 256, 533 S.E.2d 906, 910 (Ct. App. 2000) ("The grant or 
denial of a motion for a new trial nisi rests within the discretion of the trial judge 
and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless his findings are wholly 
unsupported by the evidence or the conclusions reached are controlled by error of 
law."). 
Furthermore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Freeman, 
there is evidence to support the judge's denial of Hendrick's motions for a direct 
verdict and JNOV as the evidence yielded more than one reasonable inference 
regarding the cause of action under the Dealers Act.  See RFT Mgmt. Co., L.L.C. v. 
Tinsley & Adams, L.L.P., 399 S.C. 322, 331-32, 732 S.E.2d 166, 171 (2012) 
("When reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion for a directed verdict or a 
JNOV, this Court must apply the same standard as the trial court by viewing the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party."). 
Freeman offered evidence that Hendrick charged closing fees on every 
vehicle sold between August 29, 2002 and August 29, 2006.  As stipulated by the 
parties, Hendrick collected $1,445,786 in closing fees from 5,314 car buyers 
during the relevant time period. Despite notifying customers that the closing fee 
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was a "means of reimbursing it for certain overhead costs such as document 
retrieval and document preparation," there was no evidence presented that 
Hendrick calculated what accounted for the amount of the charged closing fee.  
Randy Watkins, Hendrick's Vice-President of Transaction Compliance, 
acknowledged that it would be unfair for a dealership to charge a closing fee that 
was not tied to the actual closing costs.  Without evidence that the closing fee 
constituted an amount directly related to the closing of a vehicle, the jury could 
have reasonably found that Hendrick's actions were arbitrary and unfair.  
Additionally, the jury could have reasonably found that Freeman and the other 
similarly situated car buyers were damaged as these consumers paid a closing fee 
that was not equal to the actual closing costs incurred by Hendrick.  Finally, as 
stated in the judge's instructions, the jury was given discretion to award an amount 
between $0 and the full amount of the closing fee.  The jury's decision to award the 
full amount of the closing fees is supported by the evidence.  Accordingly, we find 
that the trial judge properly denied Hendrick's post-trial motions.   
2. Double Award of Actual Damages 
Additionally, we conclude the judge properly doubled the jury's award of 
actual damages as subsection (1) of section 56-15-110 expressly provides that a 
person who recovers under the Dealers Act "shall" recover double the actual 
damages sustained.  See Wigfall v. Tideland Utils., Inc., 354 S.C. 100, 111, 580 
S.E.2d 100, 105 (2003) ("The term 'shall' in a statute means that the action 
mandatory."). 
As previously discussed, subsection (2) of section 56-15-110 authorizes a 
person to sue in a representative capacity.  Here, Freeman brought the action 
individually and on behalf of all other affected customers.  The jury awarded actual
damages in an amount equal to the closing fees charged to all Hendrick customers 
between 2002 and 2006. Because an award of double actual damages is statutorily 
mandated, whether the amount is awarded by the jury or the judge during post-trial
proceedings is inconsequential. Thus, we affirm the judge's decision to double the 
award of actual damages. See Gardner v. Newsome Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 304 
S.C. 328, 331, 404 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1991) (recognizing that section 56-15-110 
"mandates the court to double actual damages as a statutory award to a prevailing 
plaintiff"); cf. Adams v. Grant, 292 S.C. 581, 358 S.E.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1986) 
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(holding that jury properly doubled actual damages awarded to car buyer under 
section 56-15-110(1) of the South Carolina Code).23
3. Prejudgment Interest 
In her cross-appeal, Freeman avers the judge erred in declining to award her 
prejudgment interest in addition to the award of actual damages.  Although 
Freeman is correct that prejudgment interest is statutorily authorized by the 
provisions of section 34-31-20 of the South Carolina Code,24 Freeman's damages 
were not liquidated or ascertainable at the time the class action claim arose.  
Because Freeman's theory of the case was that she paid a closing fee that was not 
equal to the actual closing costs, her actual damages could have been a portion of 
the fee that exceeded the actual closing costs.  As a result, the judge properly 
denied Freeman's motion for prejudgment interest.  See S. Welding Works, Inc. v. K 
& S Constr. Co., 286 S.C. 158, 164, 332 S.E.2d 102, 106 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(recognizing that the law allows prejudgment interest on obligations to pay money 
from the time when, either by agreement of the parties or operation of law, the 
payment is demandable, if the sum is certain or capable of being reduced to 
certainty). 
III. Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the rulings of the trial judge and the 
verdict rendered by the jury. 
AFFIRMED. 
TOAL, C.J., and HEARN, J., concur. KITTREDGE, J., dissenting in a 
separate opinion in which Acting Justice James E. Moore, concurs. 
23  As its final issue, Hendrick asserts the judge erred in awarding Freeman 
attorneys' fees and costs. However, as previously noted, the parties agreed to a 
consent order providing that Freeman would be awarded an established amount of 
attorneys' fees and costs if she prevailed on appeal. 
24  S.C. Code Ann. § 34-31-20 (Supp. 2014). 
40 

     
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
   
JUSTICE KITTREDGE:  I respectfully dissent. As a matter of law, there was no 
violation of the Closing Fee Statute.25  I would reverse the $2,891,572 verdict 
against J.L.H. Investments, LP, also known as Hendrick Honda.
I. 
The General Assembly enacted the Closing Fee Statute in 2000.  Prior to the 
passage of that statute, automobile dealers routinely included in the price of a 
vehicle a closing fee, sometimes referred to as a procurement fee.  In 1996, this 
Court addressed a challenge to a dealer-imposed $87 closing fee in Fanning v. 
Fritz's Pontiac-Cadillac-Buick, Inc., 322 S.C. 399, 472 S.E.2d 242 (1996). The 
Fannings claimed, among other things, that the closing fee violated the South 
Carolina Consumer Protection Code (SCCPC), which makes up title 37 of the 
South Carolina Code. Id. at 401, 472 S.E.2d at 244. We rejected the Fannings'
claim, reasoning that, because the fee "was charged to all of Fritz's customers in 
establishing total cash price," it was "an element of the negotiated cash price of the 
vehicle." Id. at 402, 472 S.E.2d at 244. The Fannings' unconscionability claim 
was similarly rejected.26 Id. at 403, 472 S.E.2d at 245.   
The legislature responded to our decision in Fanning by adding the Closing Fee 
Statute to the SCCPC. The Closing Fee Statute provides:  
Every motor vehicle dealer charging closing fees on a motor vehicle 
sales contract shall pay a one-time registration fee of ten dollars 
during each state fiscal year to the Department of Consumer Affairs.  
The closing fee must be included in the advertised price of the motor 
vehicle, disclosed on the sales contract, and displayed in a 
conspicuous location in the motor vehicle dealership.  
S.C. Code Ann. § 37-2-307 (2015).  In implementing the statute, the South 
Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs (Department) issued an "Administrative 
Interpretation" on June 7, 2001, setting forth the process and guidelines for 
automobile dealers to follow to ensure compliance with the statute:    
25  S.C. Code Ann. § 37-2-307 (2015).  

26  The Fanning Court nonetheless noted that its holding did "not imply that 

inclusion of such fees may not be attacked on other grounds, such as claims for 

fraud, misrepresentation[,] or unfair trade practices." Fanning, 322 S.C. at 404 n.8, 

472 S.E.2d at 245 n.8. 
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The assessment of a "closing" or "documentation" fee (also 
occasionally denominated as an "administrative," "processing," or 
"procurement" fee) in a consumer credit sale of a motor vehicle is 
depend[e]nt on four factors: 1.) The dealer must pay the Department a 
registration fee each state fiscal year in the amount of ten ($10.00) 
dollars prior to the assessment of a closing fee; 2.) The existence of a 
closing fee must be disclosed on the sales contract; 3.) The closing fee 
must be disclosed in a statement displayed in a conspicuous location 
in the motor vehicle dealership; and 4.) If the closing fee is charged, 
and the vehicle is advertised, the closing fee must be included in the 
advertised price. A dealership may use the attached form to make its 
filing with the Department. A closing fee may only be assessed once 
these factors are met and the dealership has in its possession a date 
stamped copy of its disclosure stamped by the Department.  The 
charging of a "closing," "documentation," or similar fee[] in 
connection with a consumer credit sale of a motor vehicle in the 
absence of any of these requirements constitutes the charging of an 
excess charge for Consumer Protection Code purposes. 
S.C. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, Administrative Interpretation 2.307-0101, 
at 1 (2001). 
It is undisputed that Hendrick Honda complied with the Department's
Administrative Interpretation in every respect.  Hendrick Honda: (1) timely paid 
the registration fee; (2) disclosed the closing fee on its sales contracts; (3) 
displayed the notice of a closing fee in a conspicuous place in the dealership; and 
(4) included the closing fee in the advertised price of each of its vehicles.  The 
Department annually authorized Hendrick Honda to charge a closing fee, not to 
exceed a designated amount.  Having complied with the Department's
Administrative Interpretation, there can be no liability under the SCCPC.  See S.C.
Code Ann. § 37-6-104(4) ("Except for refund of an excess charge, no liability is 
imposed under this title for an act done or omitted in conformity with a rule of the 
administrator notwithstanding that after the act or omission the rule may be . . . 
determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason."); id. § 37-6-
506(3) ("No provision of this title or of any statute to which this title refers which 
imposes any penalty on any creditor shall apply to any act done, or omitted to be 
done, in conformity with any rule or regulation so adopted, amended[,] or repealed 
or in conformity with any written order, opinion, interpretation[,] or statement of 
the Commission [on Consumer Affairs] or of the administrator, notwithstanding 
that such rule, regulation, order, opinion, interpretation[,] or statement may, after 
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such act or omission . . . be determined by judicial or other authority to be 
erroneous or invalid for any reason."). Unlike the majority, I would give efficacy 
to the legislature's placement of the Closing Fee Statute in the SCCPC.  While Julie 
Freeman's Complaint seeks recovery for an alleged violation of the Dealers Act,27
she concedes there can be no violation of the Dealers Act without a violation of the 
Closing Fee Statute found in the SCCPC.  Because there has been no violation of 
the Closing Fee Statute, I would reverse the judgment against Hendrick Honda. 
II. 
While my disposition of the appeal would not require further analysis, I add the 
following in response to the majority opinion.  
As noted, all of the statutory and Department-imposed requirements of the Closing 
Fee Statute were satisfied when Freeman purchased her Honda Accord from
Hendrick Honda. Freeman testified to the negotiation of the car's purchase price 
and acknowledged she was fully aware that price included a $299 closing fee.  In 
fact, far from feeling she had been taken advantage of, Freeman testified that she 
"was very happy at the time [she] bought the car."  Nonetheless, Freeman, 
individually and purportedly on behalf of other similarly aggrieved customers of 
Hendrick Honda, parlayed this transparent, "happy" vehicle purchase into an 
approximately $3,000,000 judgment.   
Regarding the amount of a closing fee, the Department has provided little 
guidance. The Administrative Interpretation issued by the Department merely 
included a sample form dealers could use to provide notice to customers of the fee, 
which the form describes "as a means of reimbursing [the dealer] for certain 
overhead costs such as document retrieval and document preparation."  S.C. Dep't 
of Consumer Affairs, supra. The sample notice goes on to inform consumers that 
the amount of the fee "depends on many factors, including all products and 
27 See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-15-10 to -600 (2006 & Supp. 2014) (commonly 
referred to as the Dealers Act). Among other things, the Dealers Act prohibits 
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices." Id. § 56-15-30(a) (2006). This includes 
"any action which is arbitrary, in bad faith, or unconscionable."  Id. § 56-15-40(1). 
Freeman points to the alleged violation of the Closing Fee Statute in the SCCPC to 
establish this "arbitrary" and "unconscionable" conduct.  However, Hendrick 
Honda did not violate the Closing Fee Statute.  There has thus been no arbitrary or 
unconscionable conduct upon which to base a claim for a violation of the Dealers 
Act. 
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services bought with the vehicle." Id.  Suffice it to say, neither the terms of the 
statute nor the Department's guidance represent a model of clarity.  However, two 
certainties emerge concerning the Closing Fee Statute.   
First, as noted above, dealers are given little guidance in determining what costs 
may or may not be included in a closing fee.  This lack of guidance is at odds with 
ideal legal frameworks, which are designed to provide reasonably discernable and 
objective criteria. In my view, the absence of known objective criteria renders it 
difficult to characterize a dealer's closing fee as arbitrary.  On the other hand, I 
acknowledge that the absence of known objective criteria should not be a license 
for dealers to charge a disguised profit.  The legislature, whether by design or not, 
has entrusted the Department with the role of protecting consumers from such 
charges by requiring Department approval of dealers' requests to charge closing 
fees. And, contrary to the majority's suggestion, the Department does not merely 
rubber-stamp those requests.  See id. at 2 ("Forms considered to be deceptive or to 
misstate the law will be rejected by the Department.").  Specifically, Danny 
Collins, General Counsel and then-Deputy of Regulatory Enforcement for the 
Department, testified to the Department's rejection of an excessive closing fee 
request and indicated that the Department closely scrutinized others.   
Second, it is axiomatic that a closing fee must be predetermined, thus rendering it 
impossible for the fee to equal the actual closing costs associated with a particular 
transaction. I reject as meritless the trial court's determination that the legislature 
intended the predetermined closing fee to equal the dealer's precise closing costs in 
unknown, future transactions. 
Even assuming Freeman may pursue a claim under the Dealers Act, a new trial 
would nevertheless be warranted due to the trial court's erroneous construction of 
the Closing Fee Statute. While the trial court initially and properly found that a 
closing fee was of necessity predetermined, it further paradoxically found the 
closing fee must equal the actual dealer costs incurred in the transaction.28  This 
latter erroneous finding, and the resulting jury instructions based on it, effectively 
required the jury to return a verdict in favor of Freeman.  This becomes readily 
apparent upon reading excerpts from those instructions.  Regarding the definition 
of a closing fee, the court charged the jury:   
28 Because the closing fee is predetermined, it will, at best, only approximate 
actual closing costs. 
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The dealer may only charge the buyer closing costs that are actually 
incurred and are a necessity to the closing[,] thus reimbursing the 
dealer for actual closing costs incurred.  That is the definition that I 
charge you is the law in this case defining what a closing fee is under 
the statute . . . . 
. . . If you determine that the costs charged [were] a closing fee 
under the statute and under the definition, that would pretty much be 
the end of your inquiry, because [the defendant] had complied with 
the law. If, however, you determine that it is not a closing fee, that 
the costs were not in connection with the closing of the transaction, as 
defined [how] I just said, then you have to decide whether or not [the 
defendant] has violated what we call the Dealers Act. 
In the damages portion of the charge, the requirement that the closing fee must 
equal actual closing costs was made with even greater clarity: 
[I]f the [d]efendant's closing fees exceeded the amount to necessarily 
reimburse the [d]efendant for his actual closing costs, then actual 
damages [are] a portion of that fee which exceeded the actual closing 
costs. So if you find that [the plaintiff is] entitled to damages, 
obviously you've got a wide range in this case, anywhere from zero to 
two hundred ninety-nine dollars. 
Hendrick Honda, of course, never contended that its closing fee mirrored the
actual closing costs incurred in each transaction.  By charging the jury that 
every cent of the closing fee had to be justified by a concomitant cost, 
Hendrick Honda was essentially charged out of court.29
The majority joins me in rejecting the trial court's construction of the Closing Fee 
Statute and related jury instructions, which required the closing fee to exactly 
match the actual closing costs in each transaction.  The majority freely
29  Hendrick Honda presented expert testimony that its average closing costs 
greatly exceeded the amount of the closing fee.  The expert testified that, in 2006, 
when Freeman purchased her Honda, Hendrick Honda's average closing costs were 
$507.96, well above the $299 closing fee. No one has ever suggested the 
impossible—that Hendrick Honda incurred zero closing costs.  Yet that is what the 
jury found. I believe this glaring error is the result of the burden being effectively 
placed on Hendrick Honda, despite the boilerplate language in the jury charge that 
the plaintiff has the burden of proof.
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acknowledges that "compliance with the 'Closing Fee' Statute does not require that 
the dealer hit the 'bull's-eye' for each purchase."  I therefore do not understand the 
majority's insistence on upholding this jury verdict, which was based on an 
erroneous jury instruction that required the closing fee to equal the "actual closing 
costs incurred." 
In sum, the legislature placed the Closing Fee Statute in the SCCPC, the provisions 
of which control the outcome of this case.  I would reverse the trial court judgment 
on the basis of Hendrick Honda's compliance with the Department's Administrative 
Interpretation of those provisions. Moreover, even if I accepted the potential for a 
Dealers Act violation under these circumstances, the erroneous jury instruction 
would mandate reversal and remand for a new trial with a proper construction of 
the Closing Fee Statute, one that does not require the predetermined closing fee to 
equal the "closing costs that are actually incurred and are a necessity to the 
closing," as the trial court charged the jury.  Not only were Hendrick Honda's
actions not prohibited by statute, they were specifically approved.  Under the 
Court's ruling today, Hendrick Honda is being punished for doing exactly what 
South Carolina law permitted it to do.   
Acting Justice James E. Moore, concurs. 
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JUSTICE BEATTY:  This negligence action arose out of a collision 
involving a train and an automobile at a railroad crossing.  Willie Homer Stephens 
("Petitioner"), as Guardian ad Litem for his minor granddaughter who suffered a 
traumatic brain injury while a passenger in her mother's vehicle, filed suit against 
CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX") and the South Carolina Department of 
Transportation ("SCDOT"). Following a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, 
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, 
finding the trial judge did not err in admitting certain evidence, charging the jury, 
and in denying Petitioner's motions for a directed verdict and judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV").  Stephens v. CSX Transp., Inc., 400 S.C. 
503, 735 S.E.2d 505 (Ct. App. 2012).  This Court granted Petitioner's request for a 
writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.  We affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for a new trial. 
I. Factual / Procedural History 
CSX maintains a railroad track in Hampton County, which passes through 
the town of Yemassee. At issue in this case is the passive-grade crossing at Hill 
Road near state Highway 68.  The crossing has no active traffic-control devices 
such as lights or gates. Vehicle traffic is controlled by a stop sign, a stop line, and 
a cross-buck that is similar to a "Yield" sign as it is an X-shaped sign with the 
words "Railroad Crossing" in black lettering. 
On the afternoon of February 3, 2004, as Tonia Colvin drove down Hill 
Road towards Highway 68, a CSX train approached the crossing from her right.  
Colvin's boyfriend sat in the front passenger seat and her twelve-year-old daughter 
Lillian sat in the back seat on the right side.  When Colvin reached the railroad 
crossing, she stopped at the stop sign and then pulled forward to the stop line.  
SCDOT had placed the stop sign at a distance of thirty-six feet and the stop line at 
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a distance of 9.75 feet from the near rail of the railroad track.  Colvin testified that 
she did not hear or see the train before she drove onto the track.  She stated that she 
heard the train's horn when she drove onto the track.  Colvin claimed she 
accelerated to get out of the way, but she could not cross the track before the train 
struck her vehicle. 
Colvin, her boyfriend, and Lillian all sustained injuries in the accident.  An 
emergency responder testified she smelled alcohol at the accident scene.  While 
Colvin was being treated for her injuries at the emergency room, doctors ordered a 
test of Colvin's blood and urine to determine whether Colvin had alcohol and/or 
drugs in her system.  Medical records revealed that Colvin had opiates in her 
system and had a blood alcohol content of .018%.  Although Colvin denied being 
impaired at the time of accident, she admitted she consumed two wine coolers the 
morning of the accident and had taken Darvocet, a muscle relaxer, and cough syrup 
with codeine. 
Lillian's injuries were the most severe as she suffered a traumatic brain 
injury that required her to be placed in a medically induced coma for 
approximately one month.  After she awoke from the coma, Lillian received 
extensive physical, occupational, and speech therapy.  However, at the time of 
trial, Lillian still suffered intellectual, behavioral, and physical impairments.   
Petitioner instituted an action for negligence against CSX and SCDOT on 
behalf of Lillian. With respect to CSX, Petitioner primarily alleged that CSX was 
negligent in failing to sound the train's horn far enough in advance of the railroad 
crossing and failing to remove trees and other vegetation that obstructed Colvin's
view of the railroad track. As to SCDOT, Petitioner alleged that SCDOT was 
negligent because it failed to properly inspect the railroad crossing and installed 
the stop sign and the stop line at improper locations.   
At trial, Petitioner presented evidence that CSX, in 2000, started a program 
to improve sight distances for vehicles approaching its passive-grade crossings in
South Carolina by removing vegetation at crossings.  Several months before the 
accident, CSX's clear-cutting crew attempted to cut down a line of trees adjacent to 
the Hill Road crossing, but they were prevented from cutting the trees until a 
dispute with the purported landowner, Thomas Jackson, was resolved.  At the time 
of the accident, the crossing had been partially cleared.  Contrary to Colvin's
testimony, other witnesses testified that the view was unobstructed for about 2,000 
feet from the stop line at the crossing.  Jackson also testified that he was unaware 
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of any accidents at the crossing in forty years and he never had a problem with 
trees blocking his view down the railroad tracks.   
Petitioner offered Dr. Kenneth Heathington as an expert who testified 
regarding the safety issues at the Hill Road crossing.  While Dr. Heathington 
acknowledged that there were no reports of prior accidents at the crossing, he 
opined that CSX did not provide adequate sight distance for a motorist.  Dr. 
Heathington further testified that the stop sign and stop line were placed at an 
improper distance.  Ultimately, Dr. Heathington concluded that the accident would 
not have occurred had the defendants complied with the established standards of 
care. In contrast, SCDOT offered evidence that the crossing had been inspected on 
November 7, 2002, there was no obstruction at the time of the inspection, and the 
crossing met with the standards for the placement of stop signs and stop lines.   
Petitioner also offered evidence that South Carolina law requires that a 
train's horn be sounded continuously from a distance of at least 1,500 feet from the 
road until the engine has crossed it.1  CSX's counsel admitted in his opening 
statement that the train's engineer did not begin sounding the train's horn at the 
proper time.  The engineer testified that he "believed" he blew the horn on time; 
however, the train's event recorder revealed that he did not blow the horn until the 
engine was 1,161 feet from the crossing.   
After CSX and SCDOT presented their evidence, Petitioner moved for a 
directed verdict as to both defendants. With respect to CSX, Petitioner argued that 
he was entitled to a directed verdict because there was no issue that CSX was 
"negligent [in] failing to cut the crossing" and "blow the horn as required by law."  
Petitioner conceded that there were "issues about proximate cause."   
Following the denial of his motion, Petitioner presented rebuttal evidence, 
which included a stipulation with CSX that the data from the train's event recorder 
was accurate. Petitioner then rested his case without renewing his motion for a 
directed verdict. 
After charging the jury, the judge submitted to the jury a verdict form that 
contained special interrogatories.  The first question on the form asked the jury to 
determine whether CSX or SCDOT was negligent.  The jury answered "NO" as to 
1 S.C. Code Ann. § 58-15-910 (1977) (mandating that a bell and whistle be 
installed on locomotives and sounded at least 1,500 feet from railroad crossing). 
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both defendants and, as a result, did not answer any of the remaining questions on 
the verdict form regarding proximate cause or damages.   
Petitioner filed a timely post-trial motion in which he moved for JNOV, 
pursuant to Rule 50(b) of South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,2 on the grounds 
the trial judge erred in failing to direct a verdict in favor of Petitioner against CSX 
on the issue of negligence given CSX admittedly failed to:  (1) sound the train's 
horn in accordance with section 58-15-910 of the South Carolina Code; and (2) 
clear the subject railroad crossing in accordance with its own rules and regulations.  
Alternatively, Petitioner moved for a new trial on the grounds the trial judge erred 
in: (1) declining to admit certain evidence; (2) failing to charge the jury with 
Petitioner's proposed instructions; and (3) charging intervening or superseding 
cause and inapplicable South Carolina Code provisions.  After the judge denied 
these motions, Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed.3 Stephens v. CSX 
Transp., Inc., 400 S.C. 503, 735 S.E.2d 505 (Ct. App. 2012).  The court 
unanimously affirmed the trial judge's denial of Petitioner's motions for directed 
verdict and JNOV on the ground the issue was not preserved for appellate review.  
Id. at 515-20, 735 S.E.2d at 512-14.  The court found that Petitioner's failure to 
renew his directed verdict motion after he presented evidence in reply waived his 
right to move for JNOV. Id. at 520, 735 S.E.2d at 514. 
2  Rule 50(b) provides in pertinent part: 
Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the 
evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is 
deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later 
determination of the legal questions raised by the motion.  A party 
who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict 
and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment 
entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; or if a 
verdict was not returned, such party may move for judgment in 
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict.   
Rule 50(b), SCRCP (emphasis added). 
3  In his appeal to this Court, Petitioner does not challenge the evidentiary rulings 
by the trial judge or the Court of Appeals' decision on this issue.  Accordingly, we 
have not addressed this portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion. 
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The court, however, issued a divided opinion with respect to Petitioner's 
challenges to the trial judge's rulings involving the jury charge.  Id. at 520-25, 735 
S.E.2d at 514-17. Initially, because the jury determined that neither CSX nor 
SCDOT breached its duty of reasonable care, the majority found it unnecessary to 
address any ruling on the jury charge "unless it relates to breach of CSX's and 
DOT's duty of reasonable care."  Id. at 520, 735 S.E.2d at 514. The majority 
rejected each of Petitioner's arguments regarding the jury charge.  Id. at 520-25, 
735 S.E.2d at 514-17. 
First, the majority found no error in the judge's refusal to give Petitioner's 
requested jury instructions regarding a railroad company's:  (1) liability for injuries 
occurring at crossings; and (2) duty to exercise added care when approaching and 
crossing an intersection where vegetation obstructs a motorist's view of an 
oncoming train.  Id. at 521, 735 S.E.2d at 515. The majority concluded that the 
judge's charge adequately covered the substance of the proposed instructions and 
correctly conveyed to the jury that a motorist and a railroad must exercise due care 
at a railroad crossing. Id. at 522-23, 735 S.E.2d at 515-16.
Second, the majority held that the trial judge did not err in charging:  (1) 
section 56-5-1010 of the South Carolina Code, which requires railroad companies 
to install and maintain cross-buck signs at crossings; (2) section 58-17-1390, which 
requires railroad companies to install and maintain signs reading "Railroad 
Crossing" at crossings; (3) section 56-5-1020, which prohibits unauthorized signals 
or other devices at crossings; and (4) section 58-15-1625, which authorizes 
SCDOT to close railroad crossings to public traffic when SCDOT finds the 
increased public safety of closing the crossing outweighs the inconvenience caused 
to motorists who will have to take another route.  Id. at 523-24, 735 S.E.2d at 516.  
In so ruling, the majority found the charges contained accurate statements of the 
law and there was evidence to support the trial judge's decision to give each of 
them.  Id. at 524, 735 S.E.2d at 516.
Finally, the majority rejected Petitioner's contention that the trial judge erred 
in charging the jury on section 15-78-60(5) of the South Carolina Code, which 
immunizes governmental entities from liability for injuries caused by the "exercise 
of discretion or judgment by the governmental entity or employee or the 
performance or failure to perform any act or service which is in the discretion or 
judgment of the governmental entity or employee."  Id. at 524, 735 S.E.2d at 516 
(quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(5) (2005)).  The majority agreed with 
Petitioner that SCDOT did not present sufficient evidence to prove its discretionary 
52 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
act immunity claim.  Id. at 525, 735 S.E.2d at 517. However, it concluded that 
Petitioner's argument was not preserved because Petitioner raised a different 
ground on appeal than at trial. Id.  Specifically, the Court of Appeals found 
Petitioner failed to argue at trial that SCDOT was not entitled to the immunity 
defense on the basis SCDOT did not follow an acceptable professional standard in 
its placement of the stop sign or stop line. Id. 
The dissent disagreed with the majority's decision regarding the alleged 
erroneous jury charges. Id. at 526-27, 735 S.E.2d at 517-18.  While the dissent 
agreed with the majority that SCDOT failed to present sufficient evidence to entitle 
it to a charge on discretionary immunity, the dissent found Petitioner was 
prejudiced because the charge could have confused the jury.  Id. at 526, 735 S.E.2d 
at 517. The dissent further found the judge erred in charging the jury on section 
56-5-2930, which makes it unlawful for a person to drive a motor vehicle under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs, but declining to charge section 56-5-2950(G)(1), 
which provides that a person with a blood alcohol level of .05% or less is 
conclusively presumed not to be under the influence.  Id.  The dissent also found 
the trial judge erred in charging CSX's proposed charge, which stated that "It's 
Always Train Time at the Crossing." Id.  The dissent believed this instruction 
could have suggested to the jury that the defendants had lesser duties of care than a 
motorist.  Id. at 526, 735 S.E.2d at 518. Ultimately, the dissent would have 
reversed and remanded for a new trial.  Id. at 527, 735 S.E.2d at 518. 
Following the denial of his petition for rehearing and the rejection of a 
suggestion for rehearing en banc, this Court granted Petitioner's request for a writ 
of certiorari. 
II. Discussion 
A. Motions for Directed Verdict and JNOV 
Petitioner contends the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial judge's
denial of his motions for a partial directed verdict and JNOV.  In support of this 
contention, Petitioner posits that the decision of the Court of Appeals:  (1) is 
contrary to the provisions of Rule 50, SCRCP and is based on case law that does 
not apply to the procedural posture of the instant case, i.e., where a plaintiff 
presents rebuttal evidence; (2) constitutes an unconstitutional rule change to 
existing Rule 50; and (3) is incorrect in light of CSX's admission that it breached 
its duty to timely sound the train's horn in accordance with section 58-15-910 of 
the South Carolina Code. 
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We find the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Petitioner was precluded 
from requesting JNOV because he failed to renew his motion for a directed verdict 
after offering evidence in rebuttal. The text of Rule 50(b) clearly requires renewal 
of a directed verdict motion as it states the motion should be made after "all" the 
evidence, which necessarily includes that presented in rebuttal.  See Rule 50(b), 
SCRCP (stating, in part, "[w]henever a motion for a directed verdict made at the 
close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is 
deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of 
the legal questions raised by the motion" (emphasis added)).
This interpretation is consistent with decisions in our state that require strict 
compliance with the rule.  See, e.g., RFT Mgmt. Co. v. Tinsely & Adams, L.L.P., 
399 S.C. 322, 331, 732 S.E.2d 166, 170 (2012) (" 'When a party fails to renew a 
motion for a directed verdict at the close of all evidence, he waives his right to 
move for JNOV' " (quoting Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 20, 640 S.E.2d 486, 496 
(Ct. App. 2006))); Henderson v. St. Francis Cmty. Hosp., 295 S.C. 441, 369 S.E.2d 
652 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that Rule 50(b) is strictly applied), overruled on 
other grounds by 303 S.C. 177, 399 S.E.2d 767 (1990); cf. State v. Bailey, 368 S.C. 
39, 43 n.4, 626 S.E.2d 898, 900 n.4 (Ct. App. 2006) (stating, "[i]f a defendant 
presents evidence after the denial of his directed verdict motion at the close of the 
State's case, he must make another directed verdict motion at the close of all 
evidence in order to appeal the sufficiency to the evidence").4
Moreover, additional support for this interpretation may be gleaned from 
decisions in other state and federal jurisdictions that have adopted a rule of 
procedure similar in text to our state's Rule 50.5 See, e.g., Klavens v. Siegel, 260 
A.2d 637 (Md. 1970) (ruling that movant, by offering evidence in rebuttal, 
withdrew the motion for a directed verdict by the presentation of the evidence); 
Spulak v. Tower Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Neb. 1997) (holding that "[a] 
4  Petitioner contends the cited cases, particularly Henderson, are limited to a 
factual scenario where the defendant fails to renew a motion for a directed verdict 
after presentation of the defense case. We disagree with Petitioner's interpretation 
of these cases as we discern no reason, and Petitioner does not offer any, why the 
same rule would not be equally applicable to a plaintiff who presents evidence in 
rebuttal. 
5 See 25 S.C. Jur. Rules of Civil Procedure § 50.2 (2015) ("State Rule 50 
substantially conforms to the pre-1991 Federal Rule."). 
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plaintiff who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the defendant's evidence 
and, upon the overruling of such motion, proceeds to introduce rebuttal evidence 
waives any error in the ruling on the motion" when the motion for a directed 
verdict is not renewed at the close of all the evidence). See Generally E. H. 
Schopler, Annotation, Practice and Procedure With Respect to Motions for 
Judgment Notwithstanding or in Default of Verdict under Federal Civil Procedure 
Rule 50(b) or Like State Provisions, 69 A.L.R.2d 449 (1960 & Supp. 2015) 
(collecting state and federal cases addressing proper procedure for procuring a 
ruling on a motion for JNOV). Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of Rule 50(b) and conclude that it did not constitute a rule change.  
Further, despite CSX's admission concerning the untimely sounding of the 
train's horn and stipulation regarding the accuracy of the data from the train's event 
recorder, Petitioner waived any argument that he was entitled to a partial directed 
verdict as to CSX's breach of its duty of reasonable care.  Not only did Petitioner 
fail to renew his motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, but 
he also approved a special verdict form that asked the jury to consider all elements 
of his negligence claim, including whether CSX and SCDOT breached their 
respective duties of care. See Solley v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, Inc., 397 S.C. 192, 
214, 723 S.E.2d 597, 608 (Ct. App. 2012) ("When an appellant acquiesces to the 
trial court's ruling, that issue cannot be raised on appeal."); see also Lord v. D & J 
Enters., Inc., 407 S.C. 544, 558, 757 S.E.2d 695, 702 (2014) ("To prevail on a 
negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish duty, breach, causation, and 
damages.").   
B. Jury Charges 
Petitioner next argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial 
judge's:  (1) refusal to charge Petitioner's two requested instructions regarding 
CSX's duty of care, (2) decision to charge discretionary immunity as to SCDOT, 
and (3) decision to charge three statutes pertaining to signage at railroad crossings.  
Additionally, Petitioner asserts the Court of Appeals erred in declining to address 
his challenges regarding the trial judge's decision to charge:  (1) inapplicable 
statutes, (2) an intervening or superseding cause, (3) CSX's proposed request that 
"it is always train time at a railroad crossing," and (4) the criminal statute of 
driving under the influence.  
"An appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision regarding jury 
instructions unless the trial court committed an abuse of discretion."  Cole v. Raut,
378 S.C. 398, 404, 663 S.E.2d 30, 33 (2008). "An abuse of discretion occurs when 
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the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or is not supported by the 
evidence." Id. 
"A trial court must charge the current and correct law."  In re Estate of 
Pallister, 363 S.C. 437, 451, 611 S.E.2d 250, 258 (2005).  "Ordinarily, a trial judge 
has a duty to give a requested instruction that correctly states the law applicable to 
the issues and evidence." Ross v. Paddy, 340 S.C. 428, 437, 532 S.E.2d 612, 617 
(Ct. App. 2000). However, jury instructions should be confined to the issues made 
by the pleadings and supported by the evidence. Baker v. Weaver, 279 S.C. 479, 
482, 309 S.E.2d 770, 771 (Ct. App. 1983). "A trial court's refusal to give a 
properly requested charge is reversible error only when the requesting party can 
demonstrate prejudice from the refusal." Pittman v. Stevens, 364 S.C. 337, 340, 
613 S.E.2d 378, 380 (2005). 
When an appellate court reviews an alleged error in a jury charge, it "must 
consider the court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues 
presented at trial." Keaton ex rel. Foster v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 334 S.C. 488, 
497, 514 S.E.2d 570, 575 (1999) (citations omitted).  "If, as a whole, the charges 
are reasonably free from error, isolated portions which might be misleading do not 
constitute reversible error." Id.  "This holistic approach to jury instructions is 
linked to the principle of appellate procedure that '[a]n error not shown to be 
prejudicial does not constitute grounds for reversal.' "  Ardis v. Sessions, 383 S.C. 
528, 532, 682 S.E.2d 249, 250 (2009) (quoting Brown v. Pearson, 326 S.C. 409, 
417, 483 S.E.2d 477, 481 (Ct. App. 1997)). 
1. Issues Addressed by the Court of Appeals 
a. Trial Judge's Refusal to Charge Proposed Jury Instructions 
We find Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the trial judge erred in refusing 
to charge his Nos. 2 and 3 proposed instructions.6  Although the judge's charge did 
6  Petitioner's proposed instruction No. 2 states:   
A railroad corporation has a duty to maintain its right-of-ways 
and highway railroad grade crossings in a reasonable safe condition.  
If a railroad corporation negligently allows vegetation to grow on its 
right-of-way adjacent to the crossing to such an extent that it obscures 
or obstructs the vision of the driver of a motor vehicle using the 
roadway, it is liable to anyone who is injured in a collision, if the 
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not include the particular verbiage requested by Petitioner, the charge adequately 
covered the substance of Petitioner's proposed instructions.   
In terms of proposed instruction No. 2, the trial judge fully explained the 
elements of negligence. The judge also expressly instructed the jury that "a 
railroad corporation has a duty to maintain a reasonably safe grade crossing," 
which accurately addressed the railroad's duty and was a correct statement of the 
law. As to proposed instruction No. 3, the judge charged the jury that a railroad 
corporation must use "reasonable and ordinary caution to prevent accidents at such 
crossing, and this degree of care may be affected by obstructions which prevent the 
track from being seen as a train approaches." 
Further, we reject Petitioner's assertion that the trial judge's refusal to give 
his proposed instructions effectively placed the duty of care only on the motorist.  
Contrary to Petitioner's claim, the judge instructed the jury that a motorist and a 
railroad corporation have a mutual duty to exercise reasonable care at a railroad 
crossing. Specifically, the judge charged that "there is a mutual duty on [the]
traveler and [the] railroad to exercise due care" and that "[b]oth the traveler and the 
company are charged with the same degree of care:  the one to avoid being injured; 
and the other to avoid inflicting injury." Consequently, we agree with the Court of 
Appeals that the trial judge did not err in refusing to charge Petitioner's requested 
instructions. 
Nevertheless, even assuming error, we discern no prejudice to Petitioner as 
each party's respective duty of care was accurately conveyed to the jury.  See
Chisolm v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 121 S.C. 394, 401, 114 S.E. 500, 503 (1922) 
("A railroad company and a traveler on a highway crossing are charged with a 
mutual duty of keeping a lookout for danger, and the degree of vigilance required 
of both is in proportion to the known risk; the greater the danger, the greater the 
care required of both.").   
obstructing vegetation contributed as a proximate cause to the 
collision. 
   Petitioner's proposed instruction No. 3 states: 
When vegetation at a railroad crossing is such that it obstructs a 
motorist's view of an oncoming train, the railroad has a duty to 
exercise added care in the operation of timing of its train as the train 
approaches and crosses the crossing. 
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b. Discretionary Immunity 
Petitioner asserts the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial judge's
charge on section 15-78-60(5) of the South Carolina Code, which immunizes 
governmental entities from liability for injuries caused by "the exercise of 
discretion or judgment by the governmental entity or employee or the performance 
or failure to perform any act or service which is in the discretion or judgment of 
the governmental entity or employee."7  Petitioner contends the ruling was 
inconsistent because the Court of Appeals unanimously found that SCDOT failed 
to present sufficient evidence to entitle it to a jury charge on discretionary 
immunity, yet still concluded there was no reversible error since Petitioner 
changed his argument on appeal to include SCDOT's failure to follow professional 
standards in the placement of the signs at the Hill Road crossing.  Petitioner 
concedes that the phrase "professional standards" was not specifically used in 
objecting to the discretionary immunity charge; however, he maintains the 
objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review.   
We agree with Petitioner that his objection was sufficient to preserve the 
issue for appellate review as Petitioner clearly challenged the judge's instruction on 
discretionary immunity at the charge conference and cited section 15-78-60(5) in 
his post-trial motion.  See Buist v. Buist, 410 S.C. 569, 574-75, 766 S.E.2d 381, 
383-84 (2014) ("While a party is not required to use the exact name of a legal 
doctrine in order to preserve the issue, the party nonetheless must be sufficiently 
clear in framing his objection so as to draw the court's attention to the precise 
nature of the alleged error." (citations omitted)). 
Although we disagree with the Court of Appeals' error preservation analysis, 
we agree with its ultimate conclusion to affirm the trial judge.  However, we reach 
this decision on a different basis than the Court of Appeals.  Unlike the Court of 
Appeals, we find SCDOT did in fact present evidence that entitled it to a charge on
discretionary immunity.   
"To establish discretionary immunity, the governmental entity must prove 
that the governmental employees, faced with alternatives, actually weighed 
competing considerations and made a conscious choice."  Pike v. S.C. Dep't of 
Transp., 343 S.C. 224, 230, 540 S.E.2d 87, 90 (2000).  "Furthermore, the 
governmental entity must show that in weighing the competing considerations and 
7  S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(5) (2005). 
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alternatives, it utilized accepted professional standards appropriate to resolve the 
issue before them." Id. (citation omitted). 
SCDOT pled the affirmative defense of discretionary immunity in its 
Answer and offered evidence at trial to support this defense.  Specifically, SCDOT 
witnesses Richard Jenkins, Joel Smith, and Richard Reynolds identified the factors 
that were considered in the placement of the stop sign and stop line.  These 
witnesses also testified how the positioning of the stop sign was affected by the 
presence of an access road, driveway, culvert, and fiber optic lines.  Additionally, 
these witnesses opined that the placement of the stop sign and stop line was proper 
and in substantial compliance with the guidelines provided by the Manual of 
Uniform System of Traffic-Control Devices ("MUTCD").     
Finally, we note that Petitioner has not raised any challenge to the other 
discretionary immunity provisions charged by the trial judge, which included 
sections 15-78-60(13) and 15-78-60(15).8  Thus, even assuming error, we cannot 
definitively determine that Petitioner was prejudiced because the jury may have 
based its decision on one of these unchallenged provisions and not section 15-78-
60(5). Cf. Anderson v. Short, 323 S.C. 522, 476 S.C. 475 (1996) (stating that 
where a trial judge's decision is based on more than one ground, the appellate court 
will affirm unless the appellant appeals all grounds because the unappealed ground 
will become the law of the case). 
c.	 Statutes Involving Signage and SCDOT's Authority to Close 
Railroad Crossings 
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial judge's
decision to charge statutes related to the placement of signs at railroad crossings9
8  S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(13) (2005) (immunizing governmental entities for 
liability of a loss resulting from regulatory inspection powers or functions); id. § 
15-78-60(15) (immunizing governmental entities for liability of a loss resulting 
from the absence or malfunction of warning devices unless it is not corrected 
within reasonable time after actual or constructive notice). 
9 See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-1010 (2006) (requiring railroad companies operating 
in South Carolina to place and maintain cross-buck signs at crossing of highway 
and railroad); id. § 56-5-1020 (prohibiting placement of unauthorized signs, 
signals, or traffic-control devices in view of any highway); id. § 58-17-1390 (1977) 
(requiring railroad corporation to maintain signs at crossings with public roads). 
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and the authority of SCDOT to close unsafe railroad crossings.10  Petitioner claims
these statutes should not have been charged as they were inapplicable and created 
confusion for the jury. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the challenged jury instructions 
correctly stated the law and were applicable to the issues and evidence presented at
trial. Sections 56-5-1010 and 58-17-1390 regarding a railroad company's duties to 
install certain signs at crossings were relevant because Petitioner alleged that CSX 
was negligent "[i]n maintaining an unreasonably hazardous and unsafe crossing" 
and "[i]n failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing."   
Section 56-5-1020, which prohibits unauthorized signs, signals, or other 
devices at crossings, was relevant because Dr. Heathington opined that the Hill 
Road crossing could have been made safer with the installation of active traffic-
control devices.  Thus, section 56-5-1020, informed the jury that CSX could not 
legally install active traffic-control devices without SCDOT's authorization.  
Finally, section 58-15-1625, which authorizes the SCDOT to close unsafe railroad 
crossings, was relevant to inform the jury that CSX could not of its own accord 
close the Hill Road crossing. 
2. Issues Not Addressed by the Court of Appeals 
We conclude the Court of Appeals erred in restricting its analysis only to
those jury charge issues related to the breach of CSX's and SCDOT's duty of 
reasonable care. As will be discussed, we find that portions of the judge's charge 
were erroneous and may have tainted the jury's consideration of the initial question 
on the special verdict form regarding negligence, particularly where CSX admitted 
that the train engineer failed to timely sound the train's horn in accordance with 
section 58-15-910 of the South Carolina Code.11
10 See S.C. Code Ann. § 58-15-1625 (Supp. 2005) (authorizing SCDOT to 
eliminate unsafe railroad crossings). 
11  Throughout the appellate proceedings, CSX has argued that there was 
conflicting evidence as to whether it breached its duty of reasonable care.  As a 
result, CSX maintains that there is evidence to support the jury's determination that 
it was not negligent. We believe this argument is disingenuous given the 
admission of CSX's counsel during opening statements that the train's engineer 
failed to timely sound the train's horn in accordance with section 58-15-910 and the 
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a. Statutes Concerning a Driver's Duty to Stop 
Petitioner contends the trial judge erred in charging sections 56-5-233012 and 
56-5-274013 concerning a driver's duties at stop signs on intersecting highways 
because these statutes are inapplicable and conflict with the judge's instruction on 
section 56-5-2715,14 which specifically addresses a driver's duty to stop at a 
railroad crossing that SCDOT has deemed particularly dangerous.   
We agree with Petitioner that the trial judge erred in charging sections 56-5-
2330 and 56-5-2740. Without dispute, these statutes were irrelevant as neither 
governs a driver's duty to stop at a railroad crossing.  The statutes also conflict with 
stipulation regarding the accuracy of the data from the train's event recorder.  
Although CSX did not concede that it breached its duty of reasonable care, the 
admission of counsel and the stipulation clearly equate to a finding of negligence 
per se, i.e., breach of duty. See Fairchild v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 398 S.C. 90, 727 
S.E.2d 407 (2012) (recognizing that the violation of an applicable statute 
constitutes negligence per se). However, as acknowledged by Petitioner, there 
remained questions of fact as to proximate cause and damages. 
12 See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2330(b) (2006) (providing requirements for 
motorists when they approach a stop sign and stating in part that "every driver of a 
vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line but, if 
none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view 
of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it" (emphasis 
added)). 
13 Id. § 56-5-2740 (providing requirements for motorists when they approach a 
stop sign at a crosswalk and stating, in part, that "[e]very driver of a vehicle 
approaching a stop sign shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of 
the intersection or, in the event there is no crosswalk, shall stop at a clearly marked 
stop line but, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting highway where the 
driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting highway before 
entering the intersection"). 
14 Id. § 56-5-2715 (authorizing SCDOT to designate "particularly dangerous" 
railroad crossings and erect stop signs thereat and stating that "[w]hen such signs 
are erected, the driver of any vehicle shall stop within fifty feet, but not less than 
fifteen feet, from the nearest rail of the railroad and shall proceed only upon 
exercising due care" (emphasis added)). 
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the directive of section 56-5-2715 that a driver "shall stop within fifty feet, but not 
less than fifteen feet, from the nearest rail of the railroad."  Had Colvin complied 
with the general provisions of sections 56-5-2330 and 56-5-2740 and stopped at 
the stop line, which was located 9.75 feet from the near rail of railroad track, she 
would have violated the fifteen-foot limit mandated by section 56-5-2715.  Given 
this conflict, we believe the jury could have been confused as to which statutory 
provisions governed Colvin's duty to stop at the railroad crossing.  If the jury 
applied sections 56-5-2330 and 56-5-2740, it may have deemed Colvin negligent 
for violating section 56-5-2715. See Fairchild v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 398 S.C. 
90, 727 S.E.2d 407 (2012) (recognizing that the violation of an applicable statute 
constitutes negligence per se). 
In turn, the jury may have concluded that Colvin's negligence superseded 
any admitted or proven negligence of CSX or SCDOT.  See Gause v. Smithers, 403 
S.C. 140, 150, 742 S.E.2d 644, 649 (2013) ("To exculpate a negligent defendant, 
the intervening cause must be one which breaks the sequence or causal connection 
between the defendant's negligence and the injury alleged." (citation omitted)); 
Matthews v. Porter, 239 S.C. 620, 628, 124 S.E. 321, 325 (1962) ("In order to 
relieve the defendant of responsibility for the event, the intervening cause must be 
a superseding cause. It is a superseding cause if it so entirely supersedes the 
operation of the defendant's negligence that it alone, without his negligence 
contributing thereto in the slightest degree, produces the injury." (citation 
omitted)).  Consequently, we find that Petitioner was prejudiced by the judge's
error. 
b. Intervening or Superseding Cause 
Next, Petitioner asserts the trial judge erred in charging the law of 
intervening or superseding cause because any allegation of negligence against 
Colvin was "foreseeable as a matter of law, and therefore, could not serve as an 
intervening, superseding cause." Petitioner claims it was foreseeable that a 
motorist might not stop at the stop line at the Hill Road crossing as that stop line 
was improperly placed at a location that was too close to the railroad track.   
We find Petitioner's argument to be without merit as evidence was presented 
that any negligence on the part of Colvin was not limited to the issue of the stop 
line. Rather, there was evidence that even though Colvin stopped at the line, she 
failed to yield, failed to exercise due care, and admitted to consuming alcohol and 
prescription medication prior to driving her vehicle.  Any of these actions on the 
part of Colvin, none of which was reasonably foreseeable, could have served as the 
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intervening cause of the accident. See Bishop v. Dep't of Mental Health, 331 S.C. 
79, 89, 502 S.E.2d 78, 83 (1998) ("The test by which the negligent conduct of the 
original wrongdoer is to be insulated as a matter of law by the independent 
negligent conduct of another is whether the intervening act and the injury resulting 
therefrom are of such character that the author of the primary negligence should 
have reasonably foreseen and anticipated them in the light of attendant 
circumstances."); Small v. Pioneer Mach., Inc., 329 S.C. 448, 467, 494 S.E.2d 835, 
844 (Ct. App. 1997) ("For an intervening force to be a superseding cause that 
relieves an actor from liability, the intervening cause must be a cause that could not 
have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated.").  Accordingly, we find the charge 
was proper and supported by the evidence presented at trial.   
c.  "It is Always Train Time at a Railroad Crossing" 
Petitioner argues the trial judge erred in charging the jury that "it is always 
train time at a railroad crossing"15 because the charge misstates the respective 
duties of a motorist and the railroad company at crossings.  Petitioner maintains 
that the charge, coupled with the judge's refusal to charge his proposed instruction 
No. 9,16 improperly placed a higher duty of care upon motorists at railroad 
crossings. 
Although the text of this segment of the judge's charge may be found in a 
series of cases decided in 1936 and 1940,17 a careful review of these decisions 
15  This portion of the charge states: 
I further charge you it is the law of this state it has been well said that 
it is always train time at a railroad crossing.  The law regards a 
railroad crossing as a place of danger.  The very presence of such a 
crossing is notice to the person approaching or attempting to cross it 
of the danger of colliding with a passing engine or train.  
16  Petitioner's proposed instruction No. 9 provides:  
A driver of a motor vehicle is under no absolute duty to stop, 
look, and listen before going on the track at a railroad crossing, unless 
the exercise of ordinary care and prudence under all surrounding facts 
and circumstances requires the adoption of such a course. 
17 See, e.g., Bingham v. Powell, 195 S.C. 238, 245, 11 S.E.2d 275, 278 (1940) 
("We are not unmindful of the principles long established by this Court that it is 
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reveals that the quoted language constitutes dicta and conflicts with case law that 
correctly assigns a mutual duty to a motorist and a railroad company at railroad 
crossings. See Chisolm v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 121 S.C. 394, 401, 114 S.E. 500, 
503 (1922) ("A railroad company and a traveler on a highway crossing are charged 
with a mutual duty of keeping a lookout for danger, and the degree of vigilance 
required of both is in proportion to the known risk; the greater the danger, the 
greater the care required of both.").  Due to the erroneous charge, the jury may 
have improperly assigned a higher duty of care to Colvin or shifted the duty of care 
entirely to Colvin. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner was prejudiced by this 
error. 
d. Impaired Driving 
Finally, Petitioner asserts the trial judge erred in charging the jury section 
56-5-2930,18 the criminal statute involving the charge of driving under the 
influence ("DUI"), but refusing to charge section 56-5-2950(b)(1)19 to show that 
Colvin was presumptively not impaired by alcohol as her blood alcohol content 
was .018%. Additionally, Petitioner claims the prejudice from the refusal to 
'always train time at a railroad crossing' and that one approaching must make use 
of his senses, to the best of his ability under the circumstances, to ascertain the 
presence or approach of a train and do so in time and place, so far as is reasonably 
within his control, to be effective[.]"); Breeden v. Rockingham R.R. Co., 193 S.C. 
220, 224, 8 S.E.2d 366, 368 (1940) ("It is the duty of a traveler, upon the approach 
to a railroad crossing of which he is aware, to use due care to observe the approach 
of trains at said crossing for, as stated in Robison v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 179 
S.C. 493, [501], 184 S.E. 96, 100 [1936], 'it is always train time at a railroad 
crossing.' "). 
18  S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2930 (2006) (outlining offense of operating a vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or a combination of both).  We note 
that this statute has since been amended.  Therefore, we cite to the version of the 
statute in effect at the time of the accident.   
19 Id. § 56-5-2950(b)(1) (providing that in a criminal prosecution for violation of 
section 56-5-2930 an alcohol concentration of .05 or less is conclusively presumed 
that the person was not under the influence of alcohol).  We note that section 56-5-
2950(b)(1) is now codified as section 56-5-2950(G)(1).  S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-
2950(G) (Supp. 2014). 
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20  Id. § 15-78-60(20) (2005) ("The governmental entity is not liable for a loss 
resulting from an act or omission of a person other than an employee including but 
not limited to the criminal actions of third persons."). 
charge section 56-5-2950(b)(1) was exacerbated by the judge's decision to charge 
section 15-78-60(20),20 which led the jury to infer that SCDOT could not be liable 
for its omissions because of criminal activities committed by Colvin.   
Like the dissent in the Court of Appeals' opinion, we are most troubled by 
this issue. Given the evidence, it was necessary to provide the jury with some type 
of instruction regarding impaired driving as the emergency responder testified the 
accident scene smelled of alcohol, Colvin admitted that she consumed alcohol and 
took prescription medication the morning of the accident, and Colvin's blood test 
after the accident revealed the presence of opiates.  However, because Petitioner 
presented evidence that Colvin's blood alcohol content was .018%, we find 
Petitioner was entitled to have the jury instructed on the statutory presumption 
provided in section 56-5-2950(b)(1).  In the absence of this instruction, it is 
arguable the jury found Colvin was impaired while driving and that this criminal 
act negated any negligence on the part of CSX and SCDOT.  Accordingly, we find 
Petitioner was prejudiced by the judge's refusal to charge his proposed instruction. 
III. Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the rulings of the Court of Appeals 
regarding the denial of Petitioner's JNOV motion and the jury charge issues that it 
addressed. However, we find the Court of Appeals erred in restricting its analysis 
only to those jury charge issues related to the breach of CSX's and SCDOT's duty 
of reasonable care. Because portions of the judge's charge were erroneous and 
prejudiced Petitioner, we reverse and remand for a new trial.  
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
TOAL, C.J., and HEARN, J., concur. KITTREDGE, J., dissenting in a 
separate opinion in which PLEICONES, J., concurs. 
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JUSTICE KITTREDGE:  I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the court of 
appeals in result. I begin by commending Justice Beatty on his well-written and 
thorough opinion. I further take no issue with the finding of error concerning the 
challenged jury instructions related to Tonia Colvin.  However, given the verdict 
form and the jury's determinations that CSX Transportation and the South Carolina 
Department of Transportation were not negligent in the first instance, I would find 
the erroneous jury instructions did not prejudice Petitioner. 
The Court finds no reversible error in the jury's findings of no negligence against 
CSX and SCDOT, while finding a new trial is warranted due to jury instructions 
related to Colvin. The Court even speculates that "the jury may have concluded 
that Colvin's negligence superseded any admitted or proven negligence of CSX or 
SCDOT." The jury's findings of no negligence against CSX and SCDOT preclude 
such speculation. Absent a reversible error in a jury's findings, I believe the law 
requires a court to give effect to the jury's determinations.   
On a final note, this appeal presents the frequent tension between the practical 
realities of jury deliberations and established legal principles.  The established 
principle at issue here is seen in the jury's threshold findings of no negligence 
against CSX and SCDOT. As a practical matter, is it possible that the jury ignored 
the trial court's instructions and allowed its possible view of Colvin's alleged 
responsibility for the accident to influence the verdict of no negligence against 
CSX and SCDOT? The answer is, of course, yes.  Yet there are compelling policy 
reasons to resist such speculation and for honoring the agreed-upon verdict form.  
In sum, because the jury determined that CSX and SCDOT were not negligent, the 
unrelated erroneous jury instructions should not serve as a basis for granting a new 
trial. 
PLEICONES, J., concurs. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Robert Clenton Campbell, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002218; Appellate Case No. 
2015-002220 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place respondent on interim
suspension pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 
(RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules 
(SCACR). The petition also seeks appointment of the Receiver, Peyre T. 
Lumpkin, Esquire, pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
Respondent is hereby enjoined from taking any action regarding any trust, escrow, 
operating, and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain at any 
bank or other financial institution including, but not limited to, making any 
withdrawal or transfer, or writing any check or other instrument on the account(s).   
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peyre T. Lumpkin, Esquire, is hereby appointed 
to assume responsibility for respondent's client files, trust account(s), escrow 
account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts respondent 
may maintain. Mr. Lumpkin shall take action as required by Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 
413, SCACR, to protect the interests of respondent's clients.  Mr. Lumpkin may 
make disbursements from respondent's trust account(s), escrow account(s), 
operating account(s), and any other law office accounts respondent may maintain 
that are necessary to effectuate this appointment.  Respondent shall promptly 
respond to Mr. Lumpkin's requests for information and/or documentation and shall 
fully cooperate with Mr. Lumpkin in all other respects.   
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Further, this Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution 
maintaining trust, escrow and/or operating account(s) of respondent, shall serve as 
an injunction to prevent respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) 
and shall further serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that Peyre 
T. Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this Court. 
This Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, shall 
serve as notice that Peyre T. Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this 
Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail and the authority to direct 
that respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office. 
Mr. Lumpkin's appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months 
unless an extension of the period of appointment is requested. 
Finally, within fifteen (15) days of the date of this order, respondent shall serve 
and file the affidavit required by Rule 30, RLDE.  Should respondent fail to timely 
file the required affidavit, respondent may be held in civil and/or criminal 
contempt of this Court as provided by Rule 30, RLDE.    
s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
October 29, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Dorchester County Assessor, Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
Middleton Place Equestrian Center, LLC, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2013-002320 
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court

Carolyn C. Matthews, Administrative Law Judge 

Opinion No. 5358

Heard April 21, 2015 – Filed November 4, 2015 

AFFIRMED  
Andrew T. Shepherd and Kathryn H. Hyland, both of 
Hart Hyland Shepherd, LLC, of Summerville, for 
Appellant. 
Thomas Bacot Pritchard, of Pritchard Law Group, LLC, 
of Charleston, for Respondent. 
MCDONALD, J.:  The Dorchester County Assessor (the Assessor) appeals the 
Administrative Law Court's (ALC) order affirming the Dorchester County Board 
of Assessment Appeals' finding that Middleton Place Equestrian Center, LLC 
(Middleton Place) is entitled to retain the "agricultural use" classification for 
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eleven parcels of land that the Assessor attempted to reclassify for the 2012 tax 
year. The Assessor argues the ALC erred in upholding the application of the 
agricultural use classification to the parcels at issue because they are dedicated 
solely to residential use by certain restrictive covenants.  The Assessor further 
argues the ALC erred in concluding that an agricultural use classification still 
applies to the parcels at issue even if they are not timberland properties.  We 
affirm.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case involves eleven parcels of land in the Middleton Oaks Subdivision 
(Middleton Oaks) in Dorchester County. The parcels at issue range in size from 
0.29 to 3.08 acres, and constitute a portion of a larger tract of approximately sixty-
six hundred acres owned by Middleton Place.   
In 1970, Charles H.P. Duell (Duell) inherited property from his grandfather that is 
currently part of Middleton Place,1 as well as a significant amount of additional 
property, which includes the historic manor remains and gardens designated as the 
Middleton Place National Historic Landmark (National Historic Landmark).  In 
conjunction with landscape architect Robert Marvin, Duell subsequently developed 
a master plan to sell approximately twenty-five home sites in an effort to raise the 
capital necessary to restore and make improvements to the National Historic 
Landmark.  The entire tract within the master plan was classified as "agricultural 
use." Each time a house site was sold, the site was individually platted, and the 
plat was recorded with the Dorchester County Register of Mesne Conveyances 
(RMC). The Assessor would then revise the classification for the purchased house 
site, and the site would be taxed at the then-applicable market rate.   
After the creation of the master plan, Duell established the Middleton Oaks 
Property Owners Association, Inc., now known as the Middleton Place Property 
Owners Association, Inc. (MPPOA), and created a "Declaration of Covenants and 
Restrictions of Charles H.P. Duell as Pertain to Middleton Oaks" (Covenants and 
Restrictions).2  The purpose of the Covenants and Restrictions was to create a 
residential community, "which is aesthetically pleasing and functionally 
1 Duell is the Middleton Place's principal and sole member. 
2 The Covenants and Restrictions were filed in Dorchester County on December 
21, 1979.
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convenient." Under the Covenants and Restrictions, Duell retains the sole and 
exclusive final authority for all determinations related to the covenants and 
restrictions although, at his discretion, Duell may appoint an architectural review 
board (ARB) to advise him in the process.  
In 1990, the Dorchester County Planning Board contacted Duell to request that he 
record a plat reflecting each of the potential house sites to aid in the recording 
process when a house site was sold. At that time, Duell was concerned that 
recording such a plat might require common "subdivision" type developments, 
such as standard curb and gutter, sidewalk, and roadway requirements.  More 
significantly, Duell was concerned that recording a plat reflecting the individual 
house sites might impact the agricultural use classification tract as a whole. 
Duell brought these concerns to the attention of Joe Murray, the Dorchester County 
Assessor in office at the time of the County Planning Board's platting request.  
Duell sought and received Murray's assurance that the agricultural use 
classification would not be affected. Duell confirmed this understanding to 
Murray in an August 11, 1993 letter.  From the time the plat was recorded on 
November 20, 1990, and until 2012, the subject property (as a whole) received the 
agricultural use classification for all unsold house sites.   
Both prior to and after the platting change requested by Dorchester County in 
1990, the house sites were sold at an average rate of less than one every two years.  
The last house site sale took place in 2007.  Since the creation of the master plan, 
less than twenty house sites have been sold and fewer than a dozen homes 
constructed. 
In 2012, approximately $40,000 worth of timber was cut from property in 
Middleton Place. Prior to the hearing before the ALC, the ARB had approved 
plans for the MPPOA to perform improvement cutting within the footprint of the 
parcels. Such improvement cutting is conducted periodically.  Duell has cut timber 
from each of the eleven parcels at issue since the agriculture use designation was 
reaffirmed in 1993. 
For the 2012 tax year, the Assessor denied Middleton Place's agricultural land use 
classification for the eleven non-divided parcels at issue, determining that they did 
not meet the statutory requirements for the agricultural land use classification.  The 
Assessor sent assessment notices to Middleton Place informing it of the parcels'
new assessed value for ad valorem tax purposes. Middleton Place subsequently 
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appealed the classification denial to the Dorchester County Board of Assessment 
Appeals, which reversed the Assessor's determination.  
On appeal to the ALC, the Assessor testified that the reason for his denial was two-
fold: (1) the eleven parcels at issue are all less than five acres; and (2) the 
Covenants and Restrictions do not allow for timber management and wholesale 
harvesting of timber from the contested parcels.  The Assessor subsequently 
testified that the parcels at issue are "all -- it's all timberland, yeah." The following 
questioning ensued on cross-examination:
Q: You said that the restrictive covenants that you relied 
on had somewhere in them an indication that you could 
not sell things for commercial purposes.  And I'm asking 
you where in the restrictive covenants you're referencing. 
Is it this that you're referencing? 
A: I didn't say that about Middleton.  I basically made a 
statement that it prohibited you from doing that in the 
Boyle Plantation. I can't tell you exactly what it said.  
Q: Okay. 
A: But it basically said the same thing as Middleton that -
- it's -- the basis for it is, it's there to protect the 
subdivision itself from other influences, such as cutting 
timber, growing this, doing that, whatever.  It's there to 
protect the buyers of the subdivision. If you go to buy --
if you pay a huge amount of money for a lot in a 
subdivision, I don't think you want to wake up the next -- 
one morning and there's a logging crew next door to you 
cutting all the trees off the adjacent lot.  And so that's
where I think any -- the restrictions -- the restrictive 
covenants prohibit you from doing that.  They may say it 
in different ways. It all boils down, they're there to 
protect the homeowner. It's there to protect the 
subdivision as a whole from -- from other influences, 
commercial influences. 
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Q: But Mr. Welch, you'll agree by your own admission, 
both on direct examination, just now on restatement, that 
your interpretation of the covenants and restrictions takes 
into account a whole lot of assumptions on your part. 
A: Yes, but I -- I read the -- the assumption I make is 
what I read is correct; that that's what it says.  
. . . 
But that is why they -- I said, "I assume."  I use that word 
quite freely sometimes, but that is why --
Q. Okay. 
A. -- you have covenants and restrictions. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I don't assume that. I know that the reason you have 
covenants and restrictions [is] to protect the owners of 
the subdivision, as well as the subdivision as a whole. I 
say "assume" sometimes when I shouldn't, but I don't 
assume that. I know that. That's a fact.  And that's why 
they're there. 
The ALC found in favor of Middleton Place by order filed August 20, 2013. The 
ALC denied the Assessor's motion to alter or amend on September 30, 2013, and 
simultaneously entered an amended order reversing its award for attorney's fees to 
Middleton Place. The Assessor appeals, contending the ALC erred in awarding the 
agricultural use designation for the eleven parcels.  We disagree and affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Administrative Procedures Act governs the standard of review from a decision 
of the ALC. This court may reverse or modify the decision only if:  
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced 
because the administrative findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of 
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the 
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 statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful 
procedure; (d) affected by other error of law; (e) clearly 
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and 
substantial evidence on the whole record; or (f) arbitrary 
or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or 
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2014).   
"[T]his court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the ALC as to the 
weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Trident Med. Ctr. v. S.C. Dep't of 
Health and Envtl. Control, 412 S.C. 341, 348, 722 S.E.2d 177, 181 (Ct. App. 
2015). Accordingly, this court's review "is limited to determining whether the 
findings were supported by substantial evidence or were controlled by an error of 
law." Id. (quoting Hill v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 389 S.C. 1, 9, 698 
S.E.2d 612, 617 (2010)). "In determining whether the AL[C]'s decision was 
supported by substantial evidence, this [c]ourt need only find, looking at the entire 
record on appeal, evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same 
conclusion that the AL[C] reached."  Hill, 389 S.C. at 9–10, 698 S.E.2d at 617. 
"The mere possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence 
does not prevent a finding from being supported by substantial evidence."  Id. 
(quoting Jones v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 384 S.C. 295, 304, 682 
S.E.2d 282, 287 (Ct. App. 2009)). 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
The Assessor argues that because the Covenants and Restrictions for Middleton 
Oaks limit the eleven parcels to residential use, the parcels do not satisfy the 
statutory requirements for classification as agricultural real property for ad 
valorem tax purposes. We disagree. 
"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is a court must ascertain and give effect 
to the intent of the legislature." State v. Elwell, 403 S.C. 606, 612, 743 S.E.2d 802, 
806 (2013) (quoting State v. Scott, 351 S.C. 584, 588, 571 S.E.2d 700, 702 (2002)).  
"What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of 
the legislative intent or will." Id.  (quoting Scott, 351 S.C. at 588, 571 S.E.2d at 
702). "Therefore, [i]f a statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a 
clear meaning[,] the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court 
has no right to impose another meaning."  Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting 
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 Scott, 351 S.C. at 588, 571 S.E.2d at 702)); see also Broadhurst v. City of Myrtle 
Beach Election Comm'n, 342 S.C. 373, 380, 537 S.E.2d 543, 546 (2000) ("All rules 
of statutory construction are subservient to the one that the legislative intent must 
prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language 
must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute.").   
South Carolina Code section 12-43-230(a) defines "agricultural real property" as  
any tract of real property which is used to raise, harvest 
or store crops, feed, breed or manage livestock, or to 
produce plants, trees, fowl or animals useful to man, 
including the preparation of the products raised thereon 
for man's use and disposed of by marketing or other 
means. It includes but is not limited to such real property 
used for agriculture, grazing, horticulture, forestry, 
dairying and mariculture.   
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-230(a) (2005).  The statute further explains that "[i]n the 
event at least fifty percent of a real property tract shall qualify as 'agricultural real 
property', the entire tract shall be so classified, provided no other business for 
profit is being operated thereon."  Id.  Section 12-43-230(a) requires that the South 
Carolina Department of Revenue promulgate a regulation that provides a more 
detailed definition of "agricultural real property" for county assessors to utilize "in 
determining entitlement to special assessment under this article."  Id. 
South Carolina Code of Regulations provision 117-1780.1 was promulgated "to 
address the application of the property tax laws to agricultural property and how 
property may qualify as agricultural use property."  S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-
1780.1 (2004). Pursuant to the regulation, "[r]eal property must meet the 
requirements for agricultural real property of Code Sections 12-43-220(d), 12-43-
230, and 12-43-232 in order to be classified as agricultural real property."  Id.  
Moreover, agricultural real property "shall not include any property used as the 
residence of the owner or others." Id.  The following factors are considered by 
county assessors in determining whether the tract in question is bona fide 
agricultural real property: 
1. The nature of the terrain 
2. The density of the marketable product (timber, etc.) 
on the land 
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3. The past usage of the land 
4. The economic merchantability of the agricultural 
product 
5. The use or not of recognized care, cultivation, 
harvesting and like practices applicable to the product 
involved, and any implemented plans thereof. 
6. The business or occupation of the landowner or 
lessee, however, the fact that the tract may have been 
purchased for investment purposes does not disqualify 
it if actually used for agricultural purposes.[3] 
Id.  In cases in which the real property is committed to more than one use—one 
being agricultural and the other being unrelated to agriculture—the agricultural use 
"must comprise the most significant use of the property in order for it to be 
classified as agricultural real property." Id. 
Section 12-43-232(1)(a) explains that: 
If the tract is used to grow timber, the tract must be five 
acres or more.  Tracts of timberland of less than five 
acres which are contiguous to or are under the same 
management system as a tract of timberland which meets 
the minimum acreage requirement are treated as part of 
the qualifying tract.  Tracts of timberland of less than 
five acres are eligible to be agricultural real property 
when they are owned in combination with other tracts of 
nontimberland agricultural real property that qualify as 
agricultural real property. For the purposes of this item, 
tracts of timberland must be devoted actively to growing 
trees for commercial use. 
S.C. Code Ann. 12-43-232(1)(a) (2005) (emphasis added).   
Here, there is no dispute that each of the eleven parcels at issue is less than five 
acres.  The Assessor asserts there is no evidence in the record that the parcels at 
issue are used to "raise, harvest or store crops, feed, breed or manage livestock, or 
3 "These factors are not, however, meant to be exclusive and all relevant facts must 
be considered." S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-1780.1 (2004).  
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to produce plants, trees, fowl or animals useful to man, including the preparation of 
the products raised thereon for man's use and disposed of by marketing or other 
means." See S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-230(a) (2005).  However, Middleton Place 
persuasively argues the parcels at issue are "contiguous to" and "are under the 
same management system" as tracts of timberland exceeding the minimum acreage 
requirement. See S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-232(1)(a) (2005).  
The record reveals that Duell has been the sole and exclusive owner of the eleven 
parcels since inheriting them in 1970.4 At the hearing before the ALC, Duell 
testified that from the time the plat was recorded in 1990, the parcels have been 
part of a timber management plan, which he follows throughout the whole 
Middleton property, both within the National Historic Landmark and otherwise.  
He further testified "we do have a forester full time on staff and we have a manager 
of the woodlands who the forester works for." 
Duell explained: 
[W]e don't do clear cutting with exceptions, special 
exception, but basically we do what we call 
"improvement cutting" and you have to harvest pine 
trees. Mr. Welch said that he had hardwoods; well, that's
fine. But the bulk of our timbering has been pine trees.   
Pine trees don't live, you know, more than 150 years.  
They start to rot. They're [lightning] rods.  And at a 
certain point, it's just they stop growing.  At a certain 
point, from a timber management standpoint, it's 
unquestionably wise to take them out.  And we do that on 
all the property. We respect live oaks that can live to be 
hundreds of years old and we respect a lot of hardwoods 
that make up the conservation efforts that we do.  So I 
also would like to point out that when Mr. Shepherd and 
Mr. Welch referred to the covenants talking about 
commercial activities on residential lots, the residential 
lots are where people live. The word "residential" means 
a residence. 
4 Duell's family has owned the entire tract of approximately sixty-six hundred acres 
(including the eleven parcels at issue) for over three hundred years. 
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And these are not residential lots. They're timber -- 
they’re part of the whole timberland until, under our 
system, that we -- that I sell them and they become 
residential lots. 
. . . . 
We're not doing any kind of clear cutting.  We have cut 
raised last year approximately $40,000.00 in timbering 
on another part of the LLC property, but the same 
property.   
Now we have plans this year to harvest timber on several 
sites here and the board of architectural review has 
already passed on that as an advisory board.  As Mr. 
Pritchard said, I appoint when needed, ad hoc, and the 
advisory board already approved the timber sale for this 
year, which will take these mature pines and leave the 
land probably looking better with live oaks allowed to 
grow and naturalize and so on. 
Despite Dorchester County's request that each parcel be separately platted in 1990, 
we agree with the ALC that Duell has continued to treat these parcels as a part of 
the entire several hundred acres, which significantly exceed the statutory minimum 
acreage requirement.  See S.C. Code Ann. 12-43-232(1)(a) (2005).  Moreover, he 
has managed the parcels in the same manner as the remainder of the property 
within the National Historic Landmark. 
Significantly, at the hearing before the ALC, the Assessor testified the eleven 
parcels are "all timberland" and in his appellate brief, the Assessor argues "[t]he 
record contains no evidence that Middleton Place has utilized or attempted to treat 
the [parcels] at issue as anything other than timberland."  Consequently, we are 
unable to find that the ALC's finding that "Respondent owns contiguous tracts of 
timberland which greatly exceed the minimum requirements set forth in the statute 
and are managed in the same manner as the subject parcels" was arbitrary, 
capricious, or in any way erroneous in light of the substantial evidence in the 
record as a whole. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2014).   
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Covenants, Restrictions, and the Assessor's Assumptions 
 
In denying the eleven parcels the "agricultural use" classification, the Assessor, by 
his own admission, made a number of assumptions about the application of the 
Middleton Oaks Covenants and Restrictions to the parcels.   As the ALC properly 
recognized, the Assessor sought to interpret the Covenants and Restrictions in the 
context of a traditional subdivision, failing "to apprehend and appreciate the unique 
nature and character of this property." 
Although the Assessor testified that he read all of the Covenants and Restrictions, 
he admitted he interpreted two provisions in making his determination:  
(1) All of the residential lots in Middleton Oaks shall be 
used for residential purposes exclusively.[5] 
(2) No trees, bushes, or underbrush of any kind may be 
removed without the written approval of the [ARB]. 
However, as the ALC pointed out in its amended final order, the Assessor failed to 
give credence to clear language in the Covenants and Restrictions granting Duell 
the sole and exclusive power to "appoint an [ARB] to counsel him; but ultimate 
authority for the decisions of the [ARB] shall in all cases rest with the Owner, his 
heirs and assigns." Moreover, as previously noted, the Assessor testified that the 
parcels at issue are "all timberland" and concedes on appeal that "[t]he record 
contains no evidence that Middleton Place has utilized or attempted to treat the 
[parcels] at issue as anything other than timberland."   
With respect to the Covenants and Restrictions, Duell explained: 
[T]he commercial aspect of it had not to do with the 
business of timbering, but it had to do with people having 
commercial establishments in their houses.  We didn't 
                                        
 
 
5 Under the Covenants and Restrictions, a "residential lot" is defined as "any 
unimproved parcel of land located within the Property which is intended for use as 
a site for a single family detached dwelling . . . as shown upon any recorded final 
subdivision plat of any part of the Property."  
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want someone to set up a shop or manufacturing or 
anything else in the residential lots.   
The covenants, I would suggest, are not only simply to 
protect the owner. Owners all have different ideas of 
how they should be protected.  But to protect the whole 
property in its -- in its effort to attract co-stewards for 
Middleton Place and its effort to have people living in
natural surroundings…
As we are unable to find any specific language indicating the Covenants and 
Restrictions were intended to restrict the selective cutting and appropriate timber 
management of the land, we must resolve all doubts "in favor of free use of the 
property."  Hardy v. Aiken, 369 S.C. 160, 166, 631 S.E.2d 539, 542 (2006) 
(holding that a restriction on the use of property must be created in express terms 
or by plain and unmistakable implication, and "all such restrictions are to be 
strictly construed, with all doubts resolved in favor of the free use of property").  
Indeed, there is specific language within the Covenants and Restrictions vesting 
Duell with final authority for every decision as principal and sole member of 
Middleton Place. 
Nontimberland 
The Assessor argues the ALC erred in concluding that pursuant to sections 12-43-
232(2) and 12-43-232(3)(e), an agricultural use classification would still apply to 
the parcels at issue even if they were determined to be "nontimberland."  We 
disagree. 
For tracts not used to grow timber as provided in section 12-43-232(2), 
the tract must be ten acres or more.  Nontimberland tracts 
of less than ten acres which are contiguous to other such 
tracts which, when added together, meet the minimum 
acreage requirement, are treated as a qualifying tract.  For 
purposes of this item (2) only, contiguous tracts include 
tracts with identical owners of record separated by a 
dedicated highway, street, or road or separated by any 
other public way. 
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S.C. Code Ann. 12-43-232(2) (2005).  Under section 12-43-232(3)(e), a 
nontimberland tract not meeting the requirements of section 12-43-232(2), must 
nevertheless be classified as agricultural real property if the current owner or an 
immediate family member6 "has owned the property for at least the ten years 
ending January 1, 1994, and the property is classified as agricultural real property 
for property tax year 1994."  S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-232(3)(e) (2005).  "The 
property must continue to be classified as agricultural real property until the 
property is applied to some other use or until the property is transferred to other 
than an immediate family member, whichever occurs first."  Id. 
Our review of the record reveals that in 1970, Duell inherited this property from
his grandfather, an immediate family member.  In the early-1990s, Duell obtained 
and recorded the plat reflecting the eleven parcels not due to any desire or intent to 
ever create a traditional "subdivision" development at Middleton Place, but at the 
request of the Dorchester County Planning Board.  Thus, even if the court were to 
accept the Assessor's "nontimberland" argument, the Assessor's effort to reclassify 
the eleven parcels was erroneous because Middleton Place would be entitled to 
retain the "agricultural use" classification under section 12-43-232(3)(e).  
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the ruling of the Administrative Law Court reinstating the 
"agricultural use" classification for the eleven parcels is 
AFFIRMED.
SHORT and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.
6 "Immediate family member" is defined as "a person related to the current owner 
within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity and a trust all of whose 
noncontingent beneficiaries are related to the grantor of the trust within the third 
degree of consanguinity or affinity."  S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-232(3)(e) (2005).   
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